

— Washington Whispers —[®]

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STATINTL

Those who sit in on Vietnam policy discussions have noticed lately that the Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency often come up with opposite analyses and recommendations. The decision to mine North Vietnam's harbors was a victory for the Defense agency. The CIA reportedly opposed it—as it has for years.

12 MAR 1972

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**Jack Anderson**

Defense Spying Facing Cutback

THE WHITE HOUSE is so dissatisfied with the Pentagon's espionage network that it is decimating the once-prestigious Defense Intelligence Agency, the nation's number two spying operation.

The dramatic cutback of some 350 high-level espionage analysts, agents, data experts and other super-sleuths has been cloaked in the same kind of secrecy as DIA's spy work.

But from espionage officials themselves, disgruntled over the break-up of their agency, we can report this tumult within the DIA:

In January, at a hush-hush meeting in Arlington Hall outside Washington, the DIA's chief, Lt. Gen. D. V. Bennett, sat down with his top aides.

Bennett confided to them that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ordering a cut of an extra 10 per cent above the standard 5 per cent, across-the-board cut the President Nixon had ordered throughout government.

The general, obviously moved, detailed the firings, demotions and transfers of some of his top aides. The Soviet, free world and eastern sections of DIA were to become disaster areas, with some chiefs literally left without subordinates to do the work.

The reductions, to be sure, would save the taxpayers more than \$10 million a year, but they would remove the only real backstop to the central Intelligence Agency on foreign intelligence.

Bennett, on his own, decided to take the fight for his agency to Capitol Hill friends. Nevertheless, the Feb. 15 and March 6 dates for the first stages of the purge have already taken effect. Dozens of old espionage hands have gotten their notice. The agency is in turmoil.

Arms Deal

The United States has become the gun dealer for much of the world, pushing jet fighters, tanks, flame throwers and machine-guns the way some merchants hustle "Saturday night specials" on their customers.

When the U.S. can turn a dollar, the government sees an opportunity to help our balance of payments deficit, and turn a tidy profit for the firms that have the government's approval for their arcane trade.

Such was the case when oil-rich Kuwait decided to load up a few months ago. The American ambassador was contacted and he introduced an approved arms dealer. It was a move that met favor in Washington.

In due course, the ambassador received a secret commendation from Secretary of State William Rogers. "State and the Department of Defense wish to commend ambassador for effective manner in which he has kept U.S. private firms, rather than the U.S. government, in front as Kuwaitis consider various possible military equipment purchases," Rogers cabled. "We agree that any of these sales would represent attractive commercial opportunity for American private companies and those companies under consideration would appear capable of performing necessary training and maintenance services involved."

The secretary's eyebrows did not arch a bit as he surveyed Kuwait's shopping list. "Each type of equipment under discussion, F-5s, Hercules, Bell helicopters (and) Hawk missiles, would appear in itself a reasonable item for the government of Kuwait to acquire," Rogers said. "The question

arises, however, when one looks at the 'total package.' Kuwaitis appear to be considering, including 30 F-5's, 16 helicopters and Hawks."

He said an assessment should be made of Kuwait's total needs and insisted, "We need to strike a proper balance between the desires of American companies to pursue individual sales initiatives and the desire of the U.S. government to not see Kuwait saddled with more military equipment than it can effectively use, maintain and integrate into its armed forces."

The U.S. government saw the request as an opportunity to take a hard look at Kuwait's well-oiled military machinery from the inside. "We wonder if this request does not provide a fortuitous opportunity for a brief Department of Defense survey of overall government of Kuwait military requirements and capabilities without commitment to subsequent sales of U.S. equipment," Rogers said.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

STATINTL

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February 15, 1972

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE

S 1747

regular International Security Assistance funding for FY 1973.

In South Korea, national forces are assuming increased responsibility for their own defense. The ROK Government must maintain large defense forces to meet the threat posed by well-equipped forces in the North. Consequently, it must support a heavy burden on its national economy, and simultaneously undertake increased production in country of defense equipment, aided in part by MAP and FMS credit. Thus, South Korea may continue for some time to be dependent on the United States for support of its defense efforts. Nonetheless, greater Korean self-sufficiency in defense is signaled by that government's recent agreement to assume responsibility for procurement of operating material formerly supplied under MAP as well as inauguration of an FMS credit program to finance development of M-16 rifle and ammunition production facilities in-country.

A significant feature of the five-year program to advance Korean force modernization is our plan to provide the new International Fighter Aircraft, the F-5E. This aircraft has been developed specifically to meet the need of allied and friendly air forces for an effective and flexible, yet relatively simple and inexpensive new fighter aircraft. Congress had a strong role in initiating this program.

U.S. security assistance to our NATO allies, except for Turkey, Greece and Portugal is limited almost exclusively to military export cash sales. Credit assistance is no longer required in most instances, and military sales to Europe represent an economic gain rather than a drain to the U.S. However, three allies, Turkey, Greece and Portugal, continue to require outside grant and credit security assistance to permit them to improve their capabilities for fulfilling their assigned roles in NATO defense plans. Indeed, their importance to U.S. and NATO security interests have increased significantly in recent years as a result of the Soviet military buildup in the Mediterranean and the volatile situation in the Middle East. Both Greece and Turkey have demonstrated their dedication to NATO defense by major manpower and resource commitments to the Alliance. It is in the U.S. interest, therefore, to assist these willing allies to make a more effective contribution to NATO defense by helping them acquire more modern defense equipment and improved training. In the case of Greece, economic growth now permits U.S. assistance for the most part, to take the form of FMS credit for arms purchases rather than outright grants.

2. Supplementary Planning and Security Assistance

Security assistance can also advance U.S. security in ways less directly related to specific force trade-offs under total force planning. As we work cooperatively with the military officers who play such an important role in many Latin American countries, our missions and assistance programs further our interests while responding positively to those of the Latin Americans. Latin American nations are our partners, not our dependents. We seek only to assist—partly through the several, less explicitly military aspects of our security assistance programs such as training aids—in preserving the environment within which social and economic progress can occur.

Among our hemisphere neighbors and elsewhere, selectively, throughout the world the United States seeks to utilize judiciously its diplomatic, economic and military resources to help avert war. We must strike a balance and take care, for example, that our security assistance does not contribute to hostility between neighboring states and forces. We provide security assistance on a case-by-case basis to assist friendly countries to combat insurgency and help defeat externally inspired subversion and maintain the kind of

military balance which will deter external attack. In supplying security assistance, and in the licensing of military exports through commercial sale, we seek to emphasize regional arrangements that enhance stability. We must recognize, however, that every nation has the right to be prepared to defend itself against internal and external threats and that most nations do not themselves produce the equipment for their own defense that they may need. We must also be cognizant of the fact that today, as never before, foreign countries have alternatives to acquisition of defense equipment from the U.S.—particularly if some form of purchase is involved. Nonetheless, we shall continue to review most carefully potential sales of military equipment, even to close allies, and to refuse them where regional security or other U.S. interests would be adversely affected.

c. Security Assistance Legislation: For FY 1972 the President proposed to the Congress that it enact sweeping new foreign aid legislation authorizing and funding security assistance separately from development and humanitarian aid. The Congress elected to defer consideration of this approach and instead to appropriate funds under existing legislation. Nevertheless, by the end of the 1971 session I believe that the benefits associated with combining all elements of security assistance into a cohesive program separate from development and humanitarian programs was appreciated by a majority of the Congress.

d. Summary: I believe that presentation of security assistance budget requests in the context of the overall U.S. national security program will permit easier understanding of the linkage between the U.S. force posture and overseas deployments, on the one hand, and adequate security assistance to allied forces, on the other.

It is important that the Congress recognize and understand the important role that grant military assistance and other forms of U.S. security assistance have played over the past two and a half decades in countering threats to non-Communist countries. For while the burdens in blood and dollars which the American people have borne to help defend others have been great, they would in my judgment have been far greater without security assistance. During the past few years, I believe that we have made major progress, through security assistance, in strengthening the capabilities of Free World nations to defend themselves, thereby helping move toward a more equitable sharing of the defense burden.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT

Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. President, we in this body are daily confronted with the problems of organization and management of government at all levels. Today the Secretary of Defense presented to the Committee on Armed Services his statement in support of the fiscal year 1973 defense budget. I was extremely gratified to read that portion of his statement dealing with the organization and management of the Department of Defense. I believe that Secretary Laird's approach to these problems has great merit. It is an approach which will insure more economical use of the resources of that Department.

The cornerstones of the Department of Defense concepts of management are participatory decisionmaking, selective decentralization and delegation of authority under specific guidelines.

I would, at this point, strongly endorse one request of the Secretary of Defense.

He expressed the hope that the Congress would take early and favorable action on last year's proposal for the establishment of a second Deputy Secretary of Defense. Such favorable action would contribute an immense contribution to the improved management of the Department.

I recommend Secretary Laird's views on management to each Member of this body.

I ask unanimous consent that the organization and management section of Secretary Laird's statement be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

I. ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

In my Defense Report last year, I discussed the concepts of management we have been and are applying in the Department of Defense. The concepts of participatory decision-making, defined and selective decentralization, and delegation of authority under specific guidance remain valid and we are continuing to build upon them.

Application of these management concepts places more emphasis on people and less emphasis on elaborate detailed procedures. Our approach is to define the task, pick a good man, provide guidance to him and the necessary responsibility and authority to do the job.

Our experience demonstrates that people perform better if they play an active role in the decision-making process leading to the policy decision they are responsible for executing.

The members of the JCS and the Secretaries of the Military Departments remain my principal advisers on programs for the Department of Defense. They know that their views are sought and valued; they play an active role in both decision-making and in the management of the Department.

Although we emphasize decentralization of management and have increased the role of the Military Departments and the JCS, there are functions and decisions which necessarily must remain the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense. Some of the changes in organization and management made last year will assure that, as Secretary of Defense, I can better meet my responsibilities and insure better management of the resources provided to the Department.

We should all recognize that new concepts of management cannot solve all of our problems. We should also be aware that the benefits of new and improved management concepts do not accrue immediately but only in time, and that we must continue to carry the products of earlier management well into our Administration.

A. Specific improvements in organization and management

In a number of instances, the application of our new management concepts has necessitated additional changes in organization since my report last year. Among the more significant organizational and management changes instituted in the past year are:

- Establishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).
- Establishment of the Central Security Service.
- Establishment of the Defense Investigative Service.
- Establishment of the Defense Mapping Agency.
- Disestablishment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration).
- Creation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Telecommunications).
- Reorganization of the Defense Atomic Support Agency.
- Reconstituting the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).

The Federal Diary



By
Mike
Causey

Intelligence Shakeups; the authoritative Armed Forces Journal says reorganizations that have taken place in the intelligence community will mean "a better deal, not less authority . . . for members of the defense intelligence community."

An article in the December issue of the Journal speculates that Defense Intelligence Agency will get more super-grade (GS 16-18) jobs, and that better caliber military personnel will be assigned to the Pentagon unit.

Nevertheless, the Journal reports, the military spy agency is now outgunned in the bureaucratic struggle for top grade personnel. It says DIA has only 15 supergraders to run an agency of 3,088 civil service workers, a ratio of 1 chief for each 206 Indians.

STATINTL

Spending at Heart of Spying Shakeup

STATINTL

By ONE KELLY
Star Staff Writer

The creation of a consolidated intelligence program budget is at the heart of the intelligence shakeup ordered by President Nixon, informed sources say.

Preparation of the intelligence budget should for the first time give the President and other top officials a clear picture of how much is being spent for intelligence, where it is being spent and what it is buying, these officials said.

Richard Helms, who now is head of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be responsible for preparation of the budget as part of what the White House announcement said would be his "enhanced leadership role" in the intelligence field.

Not 'Intelligence Czar'

Informed officials cautioned, however, that the changes ordered by the President would not make Helms an "intelligence czar" in the sense that he will tell the heads of other intelligence agencies within the government how to run their jobs. His control over the pursestrings will, however, give him much more control of the over-all intelligence activities of the government than he has had in the past.

The changes ordered by Nixon also give his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger, an enhanced role in the intelligence field by making him chairman of a new National Security Council Intelligence Committee—one of a growing number of similar committees he heads.

A new Net Assessment Group will be under Kissinger. Its job is to review and evaluate all the products of intelligence work

and to make comparative studies of American and Soviet capabilities. It will be headed by Andrew Marshall, a member of the National Security Council staff.

The changes, designed to bring greater control over the estimated \$5 billion a year spent and 200,000 people who work on intelligence, have been the subject of a lengthy dispute within the administration.

Packard Unimpressed

In a press conference Thursday, the day before the changes were announced at the White House, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, one of the most outspoken government officials, indicated he was not entirely pleased by the way the struggle had worked out.

"There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this over-all intelligence that things would be improved," he said. "I don't really support that view. After having experience with a lot of people in the White House the last couple of years, trying to coordinate all kinds of things, I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. But that's my own personal view."

Because the Defense Department spends most of the money and employs most of the people and machines involved in intelligence, the changes will have a major impact there.

Consolidation Is Key

The President ordered the consolidation of all Defense Department security investigations into a single Office of Defense Investigations and the consolidation of all mapping and charting activities into a Defense Map Agency. Defense officials

said these two changes won't be much of a problem.

But they said the order to set up a National Cryptologic Command under Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, director of the National Security Agency, would "take some doing" because the Defense Department's code-breaking activities now are so fragmented.

Similarly, they said, the Defense Department faces some difficulties in reorganizing its tactical intelligence—the information used by field commanders rather than top officials in Washington.

National Terms

Although the tendency is to think in terms of national intelligence—the kind of information on which the President bases major decisions, for example—the bulk of the intelligence gathered by the various agencies is of a tactical nature, involving such things as the day-to-day movements of potentially hostile ships.

The White House said Helms a career intelligence officer, would turn over most of his CIA operational responsibilities to his deputy, Marine Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman Jr., so he can devote more time to the leadership of the over-all intelligence community.

Rep. Lucien N. Nedzi, D-Mich., chairman of a House Armed Services subcommittee that has been looking into the nation's intelligence operations, said his concern is that the changes ordered by the President place an added burden on Helms who, he said, already has a "super-human job."

"One wonders if any human is capable of that kind of responsibility," he said.

STATINTL



PENTAGON/SERVICES

Better Deal for Service Spooks?

WHITE HOUSE SOURCES tell The JOURNAL that the intelligence reorganization announced last month by the President means a better deal, not less authority—as the country's press has been reporting—for members of the defense intelligence community.

Among the specifics cited:

- More "supergrades" (GS-16 to GS-18 civilian billets) for Defense Intelligence Agency.

- Assignment of top-caliber military personnel to DIA (which in past years has had trouble getting the most qualified military personnel assigned to it and proper recognition for their work in intelligence fields);

- Better promotion opportunities for intelligence analysts (who in the past have seldom been able to advance to top management levels without first breaking out into administrative posts that make little use of their analytical capabilities).

This last point stems from a major White House concern with the nation's intelligence product: "95% of the emphasis has been on collection, only 5% on analysis and production," as one White House staffer describes it. Yet good analysts, he points out, have faced major hurdles in getting recognition and advancement. Moreover, they have been "overwhelmed" by the amount of raw data collected by their counterparts in the more glamorous, more powerful, and better rewarded collection fields.

The supergrade problem has been of special concern to the White House. A high Administration official, who asked not to be named, told The JOURNAL that the "White House [has] pledged to get Civil Service Commission approval" for a GS-18 billet which had been urgently requested by DIA Director LGen Donald V. Bennett. Bennett, he said, first requested the billet more than a year ago. Even though DIA has not

had any authorization for a GS-18, it took almost 10 months for the papers needed to justify the single high-level slot to filter through lower echelon administrative channels in the Pentagon before they could be forwarded, with a "strong endorsement" from Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, to the Civil Service Commission.

Ironically, just one day after The JOURNAL was told of the White House's determination to help get the billet approved, it was learned that the Civil Service Commission had nevertheless denied the request. Instead, it offered DIA a choice of having an additional GS-17 slot or of having a Public Law 313 post (which would require that DIA first recruit an individual highly qualified enough to justify the appointment).

DIA's supergrade structure, nevertheless, is going to improve dramatically. For at least three years, the agency has been authorized only 15 supergrades, but will get 24 more under a plan just endorsed by Dr. Albert C. Hall, DoD's new Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. The posts are known to be endorsed strongly by both Defense Secretary Melvin Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, and apparently enjoy strong backing from the White House as well.

By going from 15 to a total of 39 supergrade billets, DIA will be able not only to recruit higher caliber civilian personnel but to promote more of its own qualified analysts into these coveted, higher paying posts.

Press Misses the Point

Press reports on the intelligence reorganization convey a much different picture than the above highlights and White House sources suggest. In a 22 November feature, *U.S. News & World Report* noted in a lead paragraph that "The Pentagon appears to be a loser in the latest reshuffle." Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard is probably the man most responsible for such interpretations. In a 4 November meeting with Pentagon reporters, just one day before the White House announced that CIA Director Richard Helms was being given new, community-wide responsibilities with authority over all intelligence budgets, Packard said: "There have been people thinking if we just had someone over in the White House to ride herd on this overall intelligence that things would be improved. I don't really support that view. . . . I think if anything we need a little less coordination from that point than more. . . ."

The White House's determination to make the defense intelligence field more attractive for military (as well as civilian) personnel was first taken earlier this year by LGen John Norton, Commanding General of the Army's

Our Outgunned Spies

A QUICK JOURNAL SURVEY of government-wide supergrade authorizations shows clearly that the Service side of the intelligence community, and DIA in particular, has been "low man on the supergrade totem pole" and makes clear why the White House intelligence reorganization is aimed, in part at least, at giving Service "spooks" better recognition and more attractive career opportunities. Here are typical (in some cases, ludicrous) comparisons that can be drawn from Part II of the Appendix to the *Fiscal Year 1972 Budget of the United States*, a 1,112-page tome which gives, by federal agency, a detailed schedule of all permanent Civil Service positions:

- DIA has 3,088 Civil Service employees, but only 15 supergrades—roughly one for every 200 spooks.

- DoD's Office of Civil Defense has 721 Civil Service personnel, but 27 supergrades—one for every 27 employees, a ratio eight-to-one better than DIA's.

- The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, with only 776 civil servants, has 36 supergrades—one out of every 22, nine times better than DIA. The Peace Corps also outguns DIA nine to one, with 52 Foreign Service billets in the GS-16 to GS-18 salary brackets for only 1,188 permanent federal positions.

- The National Security Council staff has a 23-to-one advantage, 73 staffers and nine supergrade (or higher) billets. Even NSC's one-to-nine supergrade-to-staff ratio, however, pales by comparison with the President's Office of Science and Technology, which has 23 superposts but only 60 people!

Here's how the supergrade-to-people bean count for key federal agencies compares with DIA's (where authorized, executive level I through V posts are included in supergrade count):

Defense Intelligence Agency	1-206
Office, Secretary of Defense	1- 95
Library of Congress	1- 51
Office of Management & Budget	1- 78
Office of Economic Opportunity	1- 54
General Accounting Office	1- 68
Smithsonian	1- 69
Civil Service Commission	1- 69
Federal Maritime Commission	1- 14

Combat Development. In an August JOURNAL interview, Norton said he was trying to get more attention on intelligence, for example, by making the S-2 intelligence officer the field grade officer on Army battalion staffs. (The S-3, operations officer, is the senior man under current tables of organization.) Norton said he wanted to attract into the intelligence field "the best young commanders in the Army, the guys who really have a flair for a military career." CDC is about to recommend a similar upgrading of intelligence billets at brigade and possibly even division level. This parallels what the White House now hopes to accomplish by "encouraging" the Services to fill DIA billets with their most qualified people.

High Administration officials confirm reports that the White House has been frustrated by some "glitches" in the U.S.'s intelligence product and cite several examples to emphasize the need for better analysis.

Contrary to many press reports, however, which suggest that CIA Director Helms has been given more authority in part because of White House displeasure over military intelligence output, The JOURNAL was told forcefully that the examples run across the board, with problems evident in CIA's work as well. The State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau came in for criticism also. The examples cited:

- Intelligence reports insisted for weeks that the buildup of surface-to-air missiles in the Middle East cease-fire zone was not a violation of cease-fire agreements worked out between Egypt and Israel (with plenty of help from Russia and the U.S.), on the basis that the SAM sites had been there all along, but had been clandestinely emplaced before the cease-fire and were just being uncovered. "There was a lot of pressure on the intelligence analysts," a presidential adviser says with oblique reference to State Department staffers, "to lean in that direction. Too many people were hoping we wouldn't have to take a tough stance: if the missiles were there before the cease-fire, technically we couldn't charge any violation." The issue was resolved only after a "ludicrous" analysis showing that, to have hidden the SAM missiles before the cease-fire, the Egyptians and Russians would have had to secretly dig holes in the desert "big enough to hold several White Houses."

- Intelligence projected that the Soviets would stop SS-9 ICBM construction at 250 missiles: the most recent known figure is that 308 missiles have been emplaced. The 250-missile estimate was inherited by the Nixon Administration in NIPP 69 (National Intelligence Projections for Planning), published by CIA in December of 1968. By

mid-1970, the Soviets had come very close to the 250-missile force level, yet intelligence estimates were still "hedging" about any higher force levels. "It's intelligence estimates like this that drive a lot of decisions on SALT and U.S. strategic budget planning," The JOURNAL was told. Responsibility for this document has been shifted over to Defense Intelligence Agency, and it is now called DIPP, Defense Intelligence Projections for Planning.

- Intelligence reports underestimated "by a factor of six" the amount of supplies going to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam through the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville. The error became apparent about the time of the May-June 1970 Cambodian foray when the U.S. captured intact bills of lading for the port. As one Nixon aide told The JOURNAL, "We can tolerate being off by a factor of two, but six is a little much." His comment apparently was directed at CIA, whose estimates, The JOURNAL was told, differed by a factor of almost two from those sent to Washington by the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.

STATINTL

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

29 SEP 1971

On civilians and intelligence

U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird is reported to be considering a major innovation at the Pentagon, a civilian to be in charge of intelligence gathering and evaluating. And high time.

One of the very big lessons which came out of the "Pentagon Papers" was that Pentagon intelligence was different all through the Vietnam war period from intelligence gathered at CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). And there seems to be little doubt about which was the more reliable.

The Pentagon's intelligence from its own sources was guilty all through of underestimating the capabilities of the other side and of overestimating what various levels of American forces could accomplish. The most pertinent fact about it is that in 1965 Lyndon Johnson agreed to the commitment of a half a million Americans to Vietnam on the assumption that it would be all over successfully in ample time for the 1968 election.

Had President Johnson listened to CIA and State Department intelligence rather than to Pentagon intelligence he would not have made that mistake. Their reports and estimates were consistently closer to reality.

The reason for the difference is plain enough. CIA and State's INR are both staffed by full-time professionals in intelligence work, most of them civilians. There are a good many former military men in these services, but they are men (and women) who have gone perma-

nently into intelligence, not just for a short tour of duty.

Military intelligence is heavily staffed, and always so far headed, by officers to whom it is a temporary duty between regular service tours. They are not professionals devoting their entire time to intelligence. Nor are they civilians who can see such matters from a nonservice-connected point of view. It is difficult for an Army, Navy or Air Force officer to forget his own service when handling intelligence. His inevitable tendency is to hear, see, and stress any information or purported information which will enhance the role of his own service, particularly if he is going on in that service.

Ideally, the Pentagon would take its intelligence from CIA and INR. CIA has no ax to grind but its own, and there is really almost nothing it can want which it doesn't already have -- including relative anonymity and total freedom from detailed scrutiny in the Congress. A select committee of Congress goes over its budget every year. Much of it is totally secret. There are never any debates on the CIA budget in Congress. The committee is always generous to CIA. It has no special reason to turn out anything but the most objective intelligence it can manage to produce.

The Pentagon won't take its intelligence from the CIA. Human nature doesn't work like that. But it would help to have a nonservice-connected civilian in charge of Pentagon intelligence. It would reduce the likelihood of another Vietnam war.

STATINTL

Laird Eyes Civilian for Intelligence

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The White House is expected to approve soon a Pentagon plan which would install, for the first time, a civilian as the top-ranking intelligence official in the Defense Department, according to informed government sources.

The move is part of a more extensive, government-wide reorganization plan, much of which is still unsettled, aimed at making the gathering of all types of military and foreign intelligence more efficient and far less expensive.

Estimates of the current government-wide cost each year for global intelligence gathering, sorting and analyzing run to about \$5 billion and involve some 200,000 people.


The bulk of the money—an estimated \$3 billion annually—and the people—about 150,000—are associated with the Defense Department.

The Pentagon part of the planned reorganization involves establishment of a new Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence whose job would be to oversee the entire military network, including the separate activities of all three services plus those of the Defense Intelligence Agency, which is headed by a military man, and the code-cracking National Security Agency.

There are several candidates for the new post. But the man most Pentagon insiders expect to get the job is Dr. Albert C. Hall, currently a vice-president of Martin-Marietta Corp., the company that builds the booster rockets for most of the U.S. spy satellites.

Hall has a reputation as a top-notch engineer and space expert, having been one of the leading space planners in the Pentagon between 1963-65. He is no stranger to the intelligence field, currently heading the Department of Defense's science advisory committee.

The new assistant secretary will become the ranking intelligence official in the Pentagon and Defense Secretary Laird's chief intelligence advisor. As Defense officials describe the plan, however, the



1960 AP Picture

ALBERT C. HALL

... may join Pentagon

director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, will also retain direct access to Laird.

The Pentagon has never had a civilian in the top intelligence job before, on a full-time basis. (Last year, after the department was rocked by disclosures of military spying on civilians, Laird named his close friend and then Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration, Robert F. Froehke, to also serve as a special assistant for intelligence).

Behind the new move, as Pentagon officials explain it, is a need to cut down the enormous size of the military intelligence community and to weed out unnecessary projects and facilities.

The feeling that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful information it was producing was the principal impetus, according to civilian officials, for a White House-ordered study of all intelligence operations earlier this year.

In addition, some sources say that President Nixon, while impressed in large measure with the work of the civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, was unhappy with military intelligence planning going into the abortive Son Tay prison raid and the South Vi-

Also, the President reportedly was annoyed with the lag in U.S. knowledge of a Soviet cease-fire violation involving construction of SAM missile sites near the Suez Canal during the summer of 1970.

Demands for more efficiency have also come recently from Sen. Allen J. Boller (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee. Boller is threatening to cut \$500 million out of the total intelligence budget which might involve eliminating some 50,000 jobs.

Some government officials estimate that actual cuts could run to about 20,000 people and a savings of a few hundred million dollars.

While the Pentagon, as the chief target of the efficiency experts, is about to get some help, proposals for reorganizing the rest of the intelligence community appear to be still involved in bureaucratic infighting.

Plans to create a new super-agency with CIA director Richard Helms as the chief have been dropped, though many officials believe that Helms will eventually emerge with strengthened and broader powers over all intelligence operations and resources.

Plans to put a new intelligence coordinator in the White House are also said to be unsettled, though such a prospect is viewed as likely.

Helms appears to be a central figure in the question of how far the government will go to shake-up the entire intelligence community. While Helms is viewed in all quarters as the top professional in the field, some intelligence experts fear that giving him a job with a bigger administrative work load will dilute his contribution to the overall quality of U.S. intelligence, weaken the tightly knit CIA, and focus even more power in the White House.

STATINTL

Nixon Studies Shakeup Plans for Intelligence

BY MICHAEL GETLER

Exclusive to The Times from
the Washington Post

WASHINGTON — The White House is expected to decide within the next several weeks whether to act on proposals for reorganizing U.S. intelligence operations — particularly those of the military — with the aim of making these vast and far-flung activities more efficient and less expensive.

Several possible reorganization plans have been under study since early this year. Now, however, in addition to some internal Administration pressure to revamp the intelligence apparatus, Congress is also pressing the White House to act.

According to informed congressional sources, Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has threatened to cut at least \$500 million out of the roughly \$5 billion that the government is estimated to spend annually on all forms of military and foreign intelligence operations.

200,000 in Field

Ellender's action, these sources say, would have the effect of cutting about 50,000 people out of an estimated 200,000 military and civilian personnel engaged in intelligence work.

Ellender's chief targets, sources close to the senator say, are the separate intelligence operations run by each military service and the Pentagon's defense intelligence agency.

Officials have estimated that the military spends about \$3 billion of the total amount tucked away for intelligence each year in a variety of appropriations bills.

The uniformed services account for about 150,000 of the total personnel figure.

Ellender is known to be concerned about overlaps between the work of the individual services, too many agents gathering data of doubtful significance, too many admirals and generals doing work that could be done by lower-ranking men, and the setting up of a global communication network that allegedly exceeds the strategic needs of military commanders.

Government officials say that the original impetus for reorganization was also a widespread feeling in the executive branch that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly for the amount of useful intelligence it produced. Also, there was said to be dissatisfaction because the form in which some kinds of intelligence were presented to the White House was not readily usable.

There have also been reports—denied by high-level officials—that the President and his top advisers were unhappy with the military intelligence work that went into the planning of the Son Tay Prison Camp raid in North Vietnam and the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos.

Cabinet-Level Post

Under the original White House study completed last spring, a number of options were developed. The most far-reaching involved creation of a new super-intelligence agency headed by a Cabinet-level officer and combining many of the now separate activities of the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency and the huge code-cracking operations of the National Security Agency.

Another option involved movement of CIA Director Richard Helms into the White House as the top intelligence man with increased authority over all aspects of intelligence.

Some officials speculate that the Administration may choose some form of internal consolidation. This probably would involve cutting back on the military side and possibly adding a high-level intelligence coordinator to the White House staff.

STATINTL

16 AUG 1971

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Intelligence Units Face Revamping

The White House is expected to decide within the next several weeks whether to act on proposals for reorganizing U.S. intelligence operations -- particularly those of the military -- with the aim of making these vast and far-flung activities more efficient and less expensive.

Several possible reorganization plans have under study since early this year. Now however in addition to some internal Nixon administration pressure to revamp the intelligence apparatus, Congress is also pressing the White House to act.

According to informed congressional sources, Sen. Allen J. Ellender (D-La.), chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee, has threatened to cut at least \$500 million out of the roughly \$5 billion that the government is estimated to spend annually on all forms of military and foreign intelligence operations.

Ellender's action, these sources say, would have the effect of cutting about 50,000 people out of a corps of military and civilian personnel engaged in intelligence work that now numbers an estimated 200,000 people.

Ellender's chief target, sources close to the senator say, is not the highly specialized, civilian-run Central Intelligence Agency, but the separate intelligence operations run by each of the military services and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency.

Officials have estimated that about \$3 billion of the total amount tucked away for intelligence each year in a variety of appropriations bills is spent by the military. The uniformed services account for about 150,000 of the total personnel figure.

Ellender's concern is known to involve overlap between the work of the individual services, too many agents gathering data of doubtful significance, too many admirals and generals doing work that could be done by lower ranking men, and the setting up of a global communications network that allegedly exceeds the strategic needs of military commanders.

Government officials say that the original impetus for reorganization was a widespread feeling in the Executive Branch that the military intelligence apparatus had grown too large and costly in comparison to the amount of useful intelligence produced. Also, there was said to be dissatisfaction because the form in which some kinds of intelligence were presented to the White House was not readily usable.

Under the original White House study completed last spring, a number of options were developed.

The most far-reaching involved creation of a new super-intelligence agency headed by a Cabinet-level officer and combining many of the now separate activities of the Pentagon, CIA and the huge code-cracking operations of the National Security Agency.

Another involved movement of the CIA's highly esteemed director Richard Helms into the White House as the top intelligence man with increased authority over all aspects of intelligence.

Viet Combat Role Urged on JFK in '62



GENERAL LEMNITZER

... a grim chart talk.

By Chalmers M. Roberts
Washington Post Staff Writer

The year 1962 opened for President Kennedy with the grim word that he had not done enough to save South Vietnam.

According to documents from the Pentagon study available to The Washington Post, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had prepared one of those Pentagon flip-chart talks for Mr. Kennedy. Although there is no direct evidence, it seems a reasonable assumption that the talk was delivered. In any case, it is likely that the dreary word reached the President.

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, then the JCS chairman, was prepared to discuss China's problems (things must be bad because wheat had been purchased from Canada and Australia), the setup of the 16,500-man Vietcong military establishment and the belief that North Vietnam then was running a training center near the city of Vinh "where pro-Vietcong South Vietnamese receive an 18-month military course interspersed with intensive Communist political indoctrination."

"Two 600-man battalions already have completed training," said Lemnitzer. "Talking paper" for the Jan. 9 meeting with the President, "and another two bat-

talions began training in May, 1961." Here were signs of danger.

Then Lemnitzer, if he followed the "talking paper" prepared for him, was to quote the President to himself:

"The President on 22 November 1961 authorized the Secretary of State to instruct the US Ambassador to Vietnam to inform President Diem that the U.S. Government was prepared to join the GVN (Government of South Vietnam) in a sharply increased effort to avoid a further deterioration of the situation in SVN (South Vietnam)." Next, were listed the military steps the President had approved less than two months earlier.

One chart showed "approved and funded construction projects" including improvements at airfields at Pleiku, Bienhoa and at Tansonnhut (Saigon). Here was the commitment thus far. But, the "talking paper" indicated, that was not enough.

Some of the projects listed, such as defoliation were characterized as having "all the earmarks of gimmicks that cannot and will not win the war in South Vietnam." The documents do not show that the President had yet committed himself to "win the war" but that was the clear premise. The "commitment of US units" in support of President Ngo Dinh Diem's forces in one form or another "should make it obvious to the Vietnamese and the rest of the world that the United States is committed to preventing Communist domination of South Vietnam and Southeast Asia."

Yet "all of the recent actions we have taken may still not be sufficient to stiffen the will of the government and the people of SVN sufficiently to resist Communist pressure and win the war without the US committing combat forces."

The documents available do not indicate for whom moves Lemnitzer was to put to Mr. Kennedy. But a Na-

tional Security Action Memorandum of Jan. 18, nine days later, shows that the President was focusing not on sending in combat forces but on counterinsurgency.

He ordered establishment of "a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)" to "assure unity of effort and the use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries." The new group was to be headed by Gen. Maxwell Taylor. An annex to the memorandum listed the "critical areas" assigned to it as Laos, South Vietnam and Thailand.

The same day Gen. Lemnitzer sent a memorandum to Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale, who had been dealing with insurgencies for years, stating that "now a strong case can be made for increased direct participation by US personnel in the planning and supervision of Vietnamese counterinsurgency operations. Inherent in such increased direct participation should be some assurance of US support for Diem personally."

Lemnitzer was responding to Lansdale's statement that Diem was worried about a coup against him and that this had made him reluctant to let his field commanders "implement the task force concept that was an important part of the over-all plan of operations against the Vietcong."

On Jan. 26, the State Department came up with some suggestions. Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson suggested to Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric that if the Vietnamese armed forces were to be increased at the time "we would envisage strategic plans made in Saigon giving priority to areas to be cleared and held and setting forth general methods to be used. We believe these should be accomplished by numerous small tactical actions planned and executed by American and spot to meet the local situation at the moment."

Johnson wrote that State felt "our training program for ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) be based primarily on the concept that the Vietnamese army will start winning on the day when it has obtained the confidence of the Vietnamese peasants. As a specific example I suggest that we immediately seek Vietnamese implementation of a policy of promptly giving a small reward in rice, salt or money (commodities in which the Vietcong are in short supply) to every person who gives information to the army. Similarly, villages which show determination to resist the Vietcong should receive the promptest possible support."

The Joint Chiefs were concerned with the larger view. Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara sent the President a memorandum that illuminated their frame of mind.

Entitled "The Strategic Importance of the Southeast Asia Mainland," the Jan. 13 paper was signed by Lemnitzer for all the chiefs. It began this way:

"1. The United States has clearly stated and demonstrated that one of its unalterable objectives is the prevention of South Vietnam falling to communist aggression and the subsequent loss of the remainder of the Southeast Asia mainland. The military objective, therefore, must be to take expeditiously all actions necessary to defeat communist aggression in South Vietnam. The immediate strategic importance of Southeast Asia lies in the political value that can accrue to the Free World through a successful stand in that area. Of equal importance is the psychological impact that a firm position by the United States will have on the countries of the world—both free and communist. On the negative side, a United States political and/or military withdrawal from the Southeast Asian area would have an adverse psychological impact of even greater proportion, and the loss of which is

STATINTL

continued

17 JUN 1977

Inside Washington

Silos Seen
In 6 Months

Robert S. Allen and John A. Goldsmith

STATINTL

WASHINGTON — In the intelligence controversy which grew out of the empty-headed Son Tay raid, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird lamely lamented the lack of a camera which could see through roofs and inspect the already vacated prison camps.

Now, with the remarkable spy-satellite cameras looking down unobstructed, the secretary is in the middle of a new intelligence dispute. He is accused of exaggerating — even misrepresenting — the threat posed by a new generation of missile silos within the Soviet Union.

It is one of those vitally important arguments which cannot be resolved for the present. Are the Russians ominously escalating their force of intercontinental missiles (ICBMs)? Or are they simply modernizing the missile force to increase its survivability? In the intelligence community the experts are saying it will take six to eight months, given the present pace of activity at Russian missile sites, to have information on which to base a clear and definitive answer.

Meanwhile Laird's critics are free to claim that the secretary has added to the Pentagon's credibility gap. His supporters, on the other hand, will keep saying that the Russians may be opening a gap in land-based missiles.

PENTAGON, CIA AGREE— Contrary to published reports which assert that CIA and the Pentagon are at odds in the matter, it can be stated that the intelligence community is generally agreed as to what is being done at missile sites in Russia. The trouble is that no one knows what the Russians INTEND to do.

Confusion also arises from different appraisals, made at different times, as the work

progressed under the camera eye of the spy satellites. Here is how the pictures unfolded:

Early this year, after having abandoned work for months on 18 new silos for their giant SS-9 missile, the Russians holes for a larger and newly configured missile silo. Work went ahead rapidly at test sites and on operational missile fields.

Sen. Henry M. Jackson, D-Wash., gave the first warning of the ominous development in March. Subsequently, Laird and his Pentagon aides confirmed the existence of new and larger holes and said they could well mean new and larger missiles.

Recently, however, the photographs have shown that the larger holes were dug to accommodate reinforcing liners to make the silos more resistant if attacked. Whatever else may be planned, the Russians are "hardening" the new silos, to use the word the Pentagon uses.

Now Laird's critics are saying that, since the new silos are mostly in missile fields which harbor the smaller SS-11 missile, the Soviet activity is just a hardening program addressed largely to the SS-11. They note that Russian participants at the SALT talks have informally described the work as a modernization program.

NO MIND READER S—Both sides in the controversy get some support from related information. Supporting the modernization thesis, for example, are removing some of their old ICBMs from the operations fields.

On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that the Russians are planning for a series of missile tests. So Laird and his Pentagon experts are still inclined to think that a new missile, or perhaps a couple of them, are eventually to be deployed in the new

There is, in short, an argument to be made that the Russians are about to install new missiles, perhaps with MIRVed warheads. There is also an argument to be made that the Russians are simply acting to protect their missile silos much as we have acted to protect ours.

NEW YORK TIMES

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4

Times's Vietnam Series Circulating in Pentagon

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 15—

The first three installments of The New York Times series on the Defense Department's secret study on Vietnam have been circulating in the Pentagon after having been routinely reproduced in an internal news publication.

The publication, Current News, is circulated six days a week to about 2,000 senior officials of the Defense Department.

An official of Executive Agency Services, an Air Force agency that publishes Current News under the jurisdiction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for public affairs, said that he had received no orders not to reproduce the articles.

"We had to leave out a lot of other stories in order to get that stuff in," the official said.

Neither the United States Information Agency nor the armed forces radio and television network reproduced or broadcast any of the classified information contained in the news articles, officials at both Government agencies said.

June 15, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

415181

Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Dellums.
Mr. Denholm with Mr. Edwards of Louisiana.

Mr. Runnels with Mr. Long of Louisiana.

Mr. BURLINSON of Texas changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. RARICK changed his vote from "yea" to "nay."

Mr. O'KONSKI changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

CORRECTION OF VOTE

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, it has just come to my attention that the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 22, lists me as having voted "yea" on rollcall No. 67. Mr. Speaker, I did in fact vote "nay," and I ask unanimous consent that the permanent RECORD and Journal be corrected accordingly.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I have missed several rollcall votes. Had I been present and voting I would have voted "yea" on rollcall No. 106.

I would have voted "nay" on recorded teller vote No. 113 and on rollcall vote No. 114; I would have voted "yea" on rollcalls Nos. 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, and 131.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON RULES TO FILE CERTAIN PRIVILEGED REPORTS

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Rules have until midnight tonight to file certain privileged reports.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, AND RESERVE STRENGTH AUTHORIZATIONS, 1972

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules and on behalf of my distinguished chairman, the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. COLMER), I call up House Resolution 470 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. Res. 470

Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 8687) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1972 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength of the Selected

Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces, and for other purposes. After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed four hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from California (Mr. SMITH), pending which I yield myself such time as I may require.

(Mr. YOUNG of Texas asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. YOUNG of Texas. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 470 provides an open rule with 4 hours of general debate for consideration of H.R. 8687, the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1972.

The purpose of H.R. 8687 is to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 1972 for military procurement, research and development, reserve strength, and other purposes.

A total of \$13,911,900,000 is authorized for procurement. Of this amount, \$6,532,500,000 is authorized for aircraft for the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and the Air Force; \$3,645,300,000 is authorized for missiles for the several branches of service; \$3,328,900,000 is authorized for naval vessels, of which \$14.6 million is for advanced procurement for the nuclear-powered guided-missile frigate; \$176,400,000 is for tracked combat vehicles; \$193,500,000 is for torpedoes; and \$35,300,000 is for other weapons.

The legislative committee reduced procurement funds for the main battle tank program \$59.1 million; increased procurement funds for the F-111 aircraft \$112 million; reduced the request for the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile \$92.5 million; reduced the Navy's authorization for aircraft \$24.4 million; reduced the Navy's request for torpedoes and related support equipment by \$12 million; and made several other deletions and revisions in proposed spending authority.

A total of \$7,963,312,000 is authorized for research, development, test, and evaluation, as follows: for the Army, \$1,933,250,000; for the Navy—including the Marine Corps—\$2,460,469,000; for the Air Force, \$3,030,144,000; for the Defense agencies, \$489,443,000. Also included is \$50 million for the Department of Defense for use as an emergency fund for research, and so forth.

The legislation sets the strength of the Reserve forces and provides that the average strength of any Reserve component shall be proportionately reduced under certain conditions, dependent on the strength of units on active duty.

Not to exceed \$2.5 billion of the funds

appropriated are authorized to support South Vietnam, other free-world forces in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of House Resolution 470 in order that H.R. 8687 may be considered.

(Mr. SMITH of California asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SMITH of California. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 470 provides an open rule with 4 hours of debate on H.R. 8687, the military procurement, research, and development authorization bill for 1972.

The purposes of the bill are, first, to include the authorization of appropriations for fiscal year 1972 in the areas of military hardware procurement and also for military research, development and testing projects for new weapons systems; second, to authorize personnel levels for the Selected Reserves of our Armed Forces for fiscal 1972; and, third, to continue existing authority for emergency military assistance to South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand.

The total authorization contained in the bill is \$21,975,212,000, a total which is \$18,555,000 below figures requested by the Department of Defense.

In authorizing \$3,328,900,000, the full amount requested by the administration, for ship construction, the report sets forth the continuing rapid growth, both in quality and quantity of the Russian Navy. To meet this ever growing threat, destroyers, attack submarines, and missile firing nuclear frigates which will protect our carriers are necessary, and they are authorized by this bill.

The bill authorizes \$1,084,000,000 for the Safeguard ABM system.

There are some other major decisions which this distinguished committee has included: First, a denial of all procurement funds for the new Army tank;

Second, an authorization of \$277,400,000 to purchase F-111 aircraft, \$112,000,000 more than was requested by the Department of Defense, to insure that the production line remains open.

Third, an authorization of \$193,500,000 for the new MK-48 torpedo, which is claimed to be the most effective anti-submarine weapon available;

Fourth, a denial of procurement funds for the Cheyenne helicopter pending completion of a departmental study of the matter;

Fifth, an authorization of \$357,200,000 to insure continued production of the already ordered 81 C-5A aircraft;

Sixth, an authorization of \$806,100,000 for continued development of the Navy's new F-14 aircraft;

Seventh, an authorization of \$370,300,000 for continued development of the B-1 manned bomber prototypes.

Mr. Speaker, the bill was reported by the committee by a vote of 31 to 4.

There have been a number of additional views filed.

I assume there will be a number of amendments offered when we get into the 5-minute rule. The one amendment which we have all heard about is the so-called Nedzi-Whalen amendment to cut off funds for Southeast Asia as of January 1, 1972.

13 JUN 1971

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KEY TEXTS FROM PENTAGON'S VIET STUDY

Following are the texts of key of the Pentagon's study of the Vietnam December, 1963, through the Tonkin 1964, and its aftermath. Except where the documents are printed verbatim; typographical errors corrected.

McNamara Report to Johnson On the Situation in Saigon in '63

Memorandum, "Vietnam Situation," from Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara to President Lyndon B. Johnson, Dec. 21, 1963.

In accordance with your request this morning, this is a summary of my conclusions after my visit to Vietnam on December 19-20.

1. Summary. The situation is very disturbing. Current trends, unless reversed in the next 2-3 months, will lead to neutralization at best and more likely to a Communist-controlled state.

2. The new government is the greatest source of concern. It is indecisive and drifting. Although Minh states that he, rather than the Committee of Generals, is making decisions, it is not clear that this is actually so. In any event, neither he nor the Committee are experienced in political administration and so far they show little talent for it. There is no clear concept on how to re-shape or conduct the strategic hamlet program; the Province Chiefs, most of whom are new and inexperienced, are receiving little or no direction because the generals are so preoccupied with essentially political affairs. A specific example of the present situation is that General [name illegible] is spending little or no time commanding III Corps, which is in the vital zone around Saigon and needs full-time direction. I made these points as strongly as possible to Minh, Don, Kim, and Tho.

3. The Country Team is the second major weakness. It lacks leadership, has been poorly informed, and is not working to a common plan. A recent example of confusion has been conflicting USOM and military recommendations both to the Government of Vietnam and to Washington on the size of the military budget. Above all, Lodge has virtually no official contact with Harkins. Lodge sends in reports with major military implications without showing them to Harkins, and does not show Harkins important incoming traffic. My impression is that Lodge simply does not know how to conduct a coordinated administration. This has been a problem to him both by Dean Rusk and myself

(and also by John McCone), and I do not think he is consciously rejecting our advice; he has just operated as a loner all his life and cannot readily change now.

Lodge's newly-designated deputy, David Nes, was with us and seems a highly competent team player. I have stated the situation frankly to him and he has said he would do all he could to constitute what would in effect be an executive committee operating below the level of the Ambassador.

As to the grave reporting weakness, both Defense and CIA must take major steps to improve this. John McCone and I have discussed it and are acting vigorously in our respective spheres.

4. Viet Cong progress has been great during the period since the coup, with my best guess being that the situation has in fact been deteriorating in the countryside since July to a far greater extent than we realized because of our undue dependence on distorted Vietnamese reporting. The Viet Cong now control very high proportions of the people in certain key provinces, particularly those directly south and west of Saigon. The Strategic Hamlet Program was seriously over-extended in those provinces, and the Viet Cong has been able to destroy many hamlets, while others have been abandoned or in some cases betrayed or pillaged by the government's own Self Defense Corps. In these key provinces, the Viet Cong have destroyed almost all major roads, and are collecting taxes at will.

As remedial measures, we must get the government to re-allocate its military forces so that its effective strength in these provinces is essentially doubled. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM staffs, to sizes that will give us a reliable, independent U.S. appraisal of the status of operations. Thirdly, realistic pacification plans must be developed, allocating adequate resources to secure the remaining government-controlled areas and work out from there.

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tially in recent months. General Harkins still hopes these areas may be made reasonably secure by the latter half of next year.

In the gloomy southern picture, an exception to the trend of Viet Cong success may be provided by the possible adherence to the government of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao sects, which total three million people and control key areas along the Cambodian border. The Hoa Hao have already made some sort of agreement, and the Cao Dai are expected to do so at the end of this month. However, it is not clear that their influence will be more than neutralized by these agreements, or that they will in fact really pitch in on the government's side.

5. Infiltration of men and equipment from North Vietnam continues using (a) land corridors through Laos and Cambodia; (b) the Mekong River waterways from Cambodia; (c) some possible entry from the sea and the tip of the Delta. The best guess is that 1000-1500 Viet Cong cadres entered South Vietnam from Laos in the first nine months of 1963. The Mekong route (and also the possible sea entry) is apparently used for heavier weapons and ammunition and raw materials which have been turning up in increasing numbers in the south and of which we have captured a few shipments.

To counter this infiltration, we reviewed in Saigon various plans providing for cross-border operations into Laos. On the scale proposed, I am quite clear that these would not be politically acceptable or even militarily effective. We need to conduct a more immediate U-2 mapping of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing on an urgent basis.

STATINTL

Continued

STATINTL

A Training School for Public Relations

By JOSEPH P. FINE

Special to The New York Times

INDIANAPOLIS—Training for military public relations, a program now in a storm of controversy, takes place in a tranquil, bucolic setting on the outskirts of this city.

The Defense Information School at spacious and grassy Fort Benjamin Harrison is where members of all the armed services are trained to carry out their services' public relations activities.

Nearly 30,000 persons, ranging from fresh-faced recruits to combat-experienced colonels, have attended the seven-year-old school and such predecessor institutions as the Army Information School and the Navy Journalists School, which go back to the late nineteen-forties.

But despite its pivotal role, and the national controversy over the Defense Department's public relations practices, the Defense Information School has remained obscure.

It was not mentioned at all in the Columbia Broadcasting System television documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," which brought the controversy to a new pitch this spring.

The documentary suggested that military public relations amounted to a pervasive propaganda campaign to influence the public on vital issues of war and peace.

C.B.S. Material Subpoenaed

Vice President Agnew and other Administration leaders have accused C.B.S. of distortions, and a Congressional subcommittee has subpoenaed material involved in putting together the program.

The school is also not mentioned in the critical book "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine," by Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

But the school—DINFOS is the military acronym—offers valuable insight into the philosophy and processes of the military public relations effort.

To the school's supporters and the great majority of the 93-man faculty, its teachings successfully reconcile the necessarily authoritative military world, and its need at times for secrecy, with the ideals of a democratic and open society.

To its critics, including a minority of the staff and faculty, the teachings, at best, are a perfect example of the

of trying to achieve this reconciliation. At worst, the critics hold that the school pays only lip service to the ideals of an open society.

- Practical Instruction

Not everything at the school is controversial. Aside from

"policy and plans"—the principles and procedures of military public relations—the students get some very practical vocational instruction.

This involves areas such as the production of military newspapers, public speaking and broadcasting, the latter often in preparation for work with the worldwide American Forces Radio and Television Service.

A recent visitor to the school found students attending lectures or participating in do-it-yourself sessions in such diverse subjects as film splicing, newspaper layout and Latin America—the last a part of the broad-brush picture of America and foreign society presented by the International Relations and Government Department.

In one room typewriters clacked with a newsroom staccato as about 15 enlisted men and women in the uniforms of all the services strove to complete a story on deadline in a newswriting exercise.

But it is in the policy and plans classes that the students confront matters that form the essential question of military public relations: Can the person working to foster public support for the military also be relied on to provide full and honest information about military affairs to the civilian citizenry?

Affirmative Philosophy

The school holds that the answer is yes. Among the students—1,500 of whom went through the school last year in courses ranging from 2 to 10 weeks—the officers and career enlisted men most often agreed with the school.

"You can publicize the good points about the military while also making public the bad ones," Lieut. (j.g.) June Weber of the Navy said in a typical comment.

The young WAVE's view was echoed by Army Capt. Paul Longear, a rugged 27-year-old former Green Beret who was wounded twice in Vietnam.

"I'm a little leery of trying to hide things anyway," he said. "Once [something unfavorable] has happened, if you can get it out into the open maybe you can deal with it again."

Capt. Robert Musil, of the Army Reserves, an instructor in the Research and Oral Communications Department, did not hesitate to express criticisms for publication.

The 27-year-old captain from Garden City, L.I., said:

"The military information officer owes his primary allegiance to his commander and through his commander to his service, his President and their policies. By definition his interests are different from those of the public and especially any segment of the public that disagrees with Department of Defense policies."

The captain, who has a Ph.D. in modern literature, has been striving to form a branch of the Concerned Officers Movement, a peace group, at the school. He has been ordered to Vietnam and has an application pending for discharge as a conscientious objector.

"The essential fact," he said, "is that we give people training in how to be slippery before the press and how to develop good community relations."

Taking issue, defenders of the school cite lectures such as a recent one by Air Force Capt. Stewart S. Duncan of the Air Force, who stressed that the basic doctrine to be followed in releasing information to the public was "maximum disclosure with minimum delay."

For Limitations

This, he told a class of about 30 officers, is to be modified only by four limitations: national security, which prohibits releasing classified information; "policy" ("If it's not national policy to release it, then you can't"); accuracy ("Hang onto it until you check it out"), and "propriety" (such things as not invading individual privacy and "not releasing pictures of G.I.'s with beer in their hands").

The 28-year-old instructor said that information should not be considered classified "merely to avoid embarrassment."

He added that where a unit or base commander—who, he noted, has the ultimate responsibility for releasing information about his command—wants to hush up something that the public has "a right to know," the good public relations officer will seek to persuade him otherwise.

Despite the school's teachings on "maximum disclosure," this reporter was denied permission to look at the lesson plans—instructors' outlines—of certain classroom subjects.

that he was interested in but that were given on days he was not visiting the school.

Col. Frank E. Meek Jr. of the Air Force, the school commandant, said that while newsmen were free to hear any classroom lecture at the school, the lesson plans were "internal working papers" and not public documents.

He likened his position to that of C.B.S. in its refusal to turn over to a Congressional subcommittee portions of film shot for "The Selling of the Pentagon" but edited out of the final version.

PORTLAND, ORE.
OREGONIAN

M - 245,132
S - 407,186

JUN 1 1977

Nixon hints U.S., Soviets reach tentative agreement on balance of ICBM power

By THOMAS B. ROSS
Chicago Daily News Service

WASHINGTON — The United States and the Soviet Union have reached tentative agreement on a freeze of intercontinental ballistic missiles, reliable Nixon administration sources have disclosed.

Barring an abrupt reversal in the Soviet position, the sources indicated rapid results could be expected when the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) resume in Helsinki in July.

President Nixon announced last Thursday that a deadlock-breaking compromise had been worked out with the Russians on how to proceed in the negotiations. His brief and cloudy statement did not reveal the extent of the progress already made.

However, the President hinted at the tentative agreement in remarks to a group of southern editors and publishers in Birmingham, Ala., Tuesday. According to a transcript released by the White House, Mr. Nixon declared:

"The two superpowers may agree that their mutual interest will be served by a limitation on the one hand on our part of defensive weapons and a limitation on the part of the Soviet Union as far as offensive weapons are concerned."

Questioned about the remarks, White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler insisted there had been no change in the President's position as he outlined it last week. But other officials conceded that Nixon had inadvertently indicated the dimensions of his tentative agreement, in secret correspondence, with Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin.

The agreement reportedly

calls for the two nations to bring their antiballistic missile (ABM) and ICBM systems into rough balance. That would require the United States to cut back on planned deployment of the safeguard ABM and for the Soviet Union to stop building new ICBMs.

It is understood that sea-based, polaris-type missiles would be put aside for a separate agreement after the Soviet Union has been allowed to catch up.

It is also understood that U.S. fighter bombers in "forward-based systems" — Western Europe and the Mediterranean — would be considered in separate negotiations on a mutual reduction of NATO and Soviet-Bloc forces.

The tentative agreement reportedly deals only with launchers and does not attempt to limit the number of warheads per missile. The United States has begun to equip its missiles with multiple warheads that can strike different targets, and the Soviet Union is expected to follow suit.

The United States has 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs and has stopped building. The Soviet Union has about 1,460 ICBMs but at least one-third of them are obsolete. It will soon have 283 of its most advanced ICBMs, the SS-9 which can carry three or more warheads, each of which could theoretically knock out a Minuteman.

United States arms negotiators have been pressing for a 300 limit on the SS-9, thereby assuring that the Minuteman force could not be eliminated in a surprise first strike.

U.S. spy satellites have also detected work at 60 new sites in the Soviet Union, stirring fears in the

Pentagon that the Russians are starting to deploy an even more advanced ICBM.

Senate Republican sources say the Central Intelligence Agency is contesting the Pentagon on the issue. The CIA reportedly believes that at least two-thirds of the new holes are for the SS-11, a smaller missile that does not have the first-strike capability of the SS-9.

Defense Department spokesman Jerry Friedheim said, however, that the CIA and the Pentagon are working from the same "agreed estimates." He said the latest

information is that the Russians may be "involved in two separate systems of silo improvement."

"Our best judgment," he continued, "remains that we would expect to see new missiles or improvements of existing missiles."

Soviet negotiators at SALT are understood to have advised the U.S. delegation that they are "modernizing" — that is, hardening with concrete — rather than deploying more and more missiles. Nixon's tentative agreement with the Russians is based on that assumption.

Intelligence:

I Spy,
You Spy,
But What
Do We See?

WASHINGTON—Eleven years ago it was the "missile gap," and before that there was the "bomb-er gap." Two years ago there was the "first-strike threat" of large Soviet SS-9 missiles. And now there is the "big hole" threat.

Through all those Soviet threats—each one of which at the time was more presumed than real—runs a common American strand. On the basis of disturbing yet inconclusive intelligence information, the Administration—and the Defense Department in particular—drew ominous conclusions about Soviet strategic intentions and urged a new round of weapons build-up by the United States.

The latest case in point involved the big missile silo holes that American reconnaissance satellites began detecting in the Soviet Union, starting last December. As yet, they are just holes, admittedly larger than those the Soviets have dug before, but that did not stop the Defense Department and its Congressional allies from drawing conclusions about the missiles the Soviet Union intended to put in the silos.

Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington, who first disclosed the detection of the large new holes on a national television program, warned that the "Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, on another television show, followed up by stating that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with the construction of a large missile system." Coupled with these statements were warnings that the strategic balance might be tipping in favor of Moscow.

Then last week, through Republican sources in the Senate, it came out that the Central Intelligence Agency had estimated at least two-thirds of the 60 silo

holes detected so far were for the Soviet SS-11. This is a relatively small intercontinental missile comparable to the United States Air Force's Minuteman, and the Defense Department has acknowledged that it is too small to present a first-strike threat to the American retaliatory force. The size of the holes, the C.I.A. surmised, could be explained by the possibility that the Soviet Union was "hardening" its missile silos against attack, just as the United States has been doing for its Minutemen.

After that disclosure, the Defense Department began retreating. The new holes, it conceded, could be for "hardening" with concrete liners. But still, the Pentagon said, they were big enough to hold two new types of missiles, or perhaps improved models of the SS-11 and SS-9. At any rate, the Defense Department admitted, the intelligence information was too inconclusive to draw definitive judgments. That was a far cry from the impression created earlier by the Defense Department, that the Soviet Union was deploying an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps even a larger new missile aimed at a first-strike capability.

"We have just witnessed the shortest missile gap in history," proclaimed Senator William Proxmire of Wisconsin, the Pentagon's gadfly. "In a month, without the United States lifting a finger or spending a dime, this missile gap was closed. The 'scare-em' technique boomeranged."

Perhaps, as suggested by Senator Proxmire, there was just an element of politics in the selective disclosure of intelligence information about the big holes. Every spring, just as regularly as the cherry blossoms bloom on the Tidal Basin, there crop up dire new warnings about Soviet weapons with a timing that just happens to coincide with Congressional consideration of the defense budget.

The problem, however, goes deeper than political use of intelligence information, which is probably inevitable when that information has to be translated into policy and appropriations by the politicians in the Executive Branch and Congress. In part, the difficulty, as the Nixon Administration is coming to realize, lies in the disjointed way that intelligence is gathered and analyzed.

In principle, the C.I.A. was set up as the primary policy-making agency that could

provide unbiased intelligence analysis. Its director, presently Richard M. Helms, was to be the President's principal intelligence adviser. But in practice, intelligence was never completely centralized, and the C.I.A. directors have discovered that it is impossible to divorce analysis of intelligence from policy.

The Central Intelligence Director, for example, has virtually no authority over the 3,000-man Defense Intelligence Agency, which helps explain why the C.I.A. and the Defense Department could reach such differing interpretations over the big holes.

Even if intelligence operations should be further centralized—perhaps at the White House level, as is now being considered by the Nixon Administration—the problem would not be completely solved. The underlying difficulty is that intelligence is not a game of certainties but of conjectures. As in the case of the big holes, certain conjectures must be drawn on the basis of limited, circumstantial facts, and inevitably the conclusions tend to reflect the philosophical outlook and responsibilities of the policymaker.

With a responsibility for national security, the Defense Secretary has a natural tendency to choose the most pessimistic among the range of conjectures reached from agreed-upon but limited intelligence facts. That is what Mr. Laird did when he projected two years ago that the Soviet Union would deploy 500 SS-9's by 1975, and what he did when he saw the pictures of the big holes.

The difficulty is that this kind of approach can lead to a self-fulfilling form of "worst case" analysis, in which the worst that is assumed about Soviet intentions comes true because of the American reaction—or vice versa. Thus, the United States sees a "missile gap" and starts rapidly deploying them on land and on sea. The Soviet Union then starts deploying missiles at a great rate until it has more land-based missiles than the United States, which starts talk of another missile gap when those big holes are spotted.

Testifying last week before the Senate Appropriations Committee, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., former Deputy Director for Research of the C.I.A., said that if it now turns out that the Soviet Union is putting SS-11's in the big holes "then we must ask ourselves how many times are

we going to allow the 'weapons' to come before Congress, shouting 'missile gap' and 'technology gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap,' through selective disclosure of partially analyzed intelligence, in order to panic the country into expensive weapons programs."

That question is now beginning to be asked in Congress, which is far less gullible and more sophisticated than it was a decade ago, when it was willing to assume the unproved worst about Soviet intentions. Perhaps there is also a change in attitude down at the White House, where the President is willing to accept the possibility of an agreement limiting defensive ABM systems despite all the Pentagon talk about those Soviet offensive missiles. This change of attitude can probably be more important than any reorganization of intelligence agencies in preventing the Executive Branch and Congress from seeing missiles in holes where none yet exist.

—JOHN W. FINNEY

STATINTL

ALBANY, N.Y.
KNICKERBOCKER NEWS

E - 56,638

MAY 28 1971

Pentagon Leapfrog

Not many weeks ago, the Defense Department let out another of its unceasing cries of "Wolf" by saying the Soviet Union was embarked on a program of constructing launching silos for a modified version of its SS-9 intercontinental missile or possibly an entirely new missile.

With that cry, Defense Secretary Laird said the department might have to ask for more money for more strategic weapons.

A few days ago, Senate Republicans said a CIA report indicated the Soviet construction program was NOT for new missiles spoken of by the Defense Department, but was merely an upgrading of sites for its relatively modest SS-11 intercontinental missile.

Now comes Round 3. The Pentagon, in one of those contradictions in which it is so competent, says two things. It says there is no basic disagreement between its assessment of the Soviet undertaking and that of the CIA. Then, in its second breath it says the construction program may not be for one new type of missile but for TWO.

What we have here is the Defense Department playing leapfrog over the CIA. It starts with one new Soviet missile, then leapfrogs over the CIA assessment of no new missiles and comes up with two new missiles.

It is a great game for the Pentagon. But we can't help but remember that the stakes it plays with are our lives and our money.

DAYTON, OHIO
NEWS

MAY 28 1977

E - 161,249
S - 215,360

Mysterious Missile Sites Complicate the Arms Race

The Defense department and the Central Intelligence agency are arguing over the meaning of some holes in the ground, like ancients interpreting chicken entrails. The issue is as important as it is confusing, and congressional action on it could either commit billions more to nuclear weaponry or endanger the security of us all.

The holes, 60 of them, are in Soviet missile fields, and they are larger than any other holes our spy satellites have ever spotted. This has led the Defense department to conclude that the Russians are preparing sites for a new generation of nuclear missiles—perhaps one that carries several independently-targeted H-bombs in its nose.

On March 10 Secretary Melvin Laird confirmed that "the Soviet Union is involved in a new — and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program." He said the Pentagon might ask Congress for a supplemental appropriation to counter the threat.

Now the New York Times reports that the CIA has rejected the Laird analysis. CIA experts, says the Times, have concluded the larger holes are for concrete liners meant to "harden" missile sites against enemy strikes—a defensive tactic

the United States has already employed at its Minuteman sites.

Evidence for this is that most of the larger holes have been dug in existing SS11 missile fields. SS11s are relatively small missiles, and arms experts say there is no reason why huge new missiles would be placed among them. Also, the CIA reportedly has pictures of concrete liners which have already arrived at the sites. The liners are not big enough around to accommodate large missile.

It comes down to a question of intention. If the Soviet goal is to acquire a first-strike capability that would render the United States unable to respond to a surprise attack, we have no choice but to keep a jump ahead of their nuclear technology, and the jumps go by billions of dollars.

The confusion is still another reason for the United States to press the Russians hard in the strategic arms negotiations. If the Soviet Union is not plotting for a first-strike advantage, it has little reason to hesitate about limiting offensive weapons. A treaty would spare Russia the vast new spending that would be forced on it if Washington mistakes refurbished silos for new missiles and paces the arms race into another lap.

Pentagon in dispute with CIA over new Soviet missiles

From ADAM RAPHAEL, Washington, May 26

A dispute between the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon over the interpretation of the 60 new missile silos in the Soviet Union has led to a reassessment of Russia's strategic intentions at a crucial stage in the SALT negotiations.

The new silos pinpointed by satellite reconnaissance were originally described by the Defence Secretary, Mr Laird, on March 10, in alarmist terms as possible evidence of a new generation of massive offensive missiles superseding the Russian blockbuster SS9 missile.

The CIA, however, has now briefed independent arms control experts that at least two thirds of the large silos are designed to give increased protection to the relatively small SS11, equivalent to America's Minuteman-3 strategic missile.

Questioned about the disparity today, the Defence Department appeared to be backing away from the Pentagon's original assessment. The department's spokesman said information gathered within the past month gave some indication that the Soviet Union might be involved in two separate systems of silo improvement. "Our best judgment remains that we would expect to see new missiles or improvements on existing missiles," he said.

The CIA's assessment of the new silo construction is that the Soviet Union, like the US is engaged in a programme of hardening silos to protect them against the threat of a first

strike attack posed by the Minuteman-3 missiles with their new MIRV warheads. The size of the hole is explained by the need to insert concrete liners around the missile to give greater protection.

A conclusive piece of evidence is reported by intelligence analysts to have been received early last week when reconnaissance satellite pictures showed silo liners arriving at the missile sites. The photographs were also said to have indicated that the liners at neither type of site were big enough to accommodate larger missiles and those at the SS9 sites did not appear to be intended for weapons of improved design.

If the CIA's intelligence is correct the new Russian missile threat posed by the Pentagon and the hawks in unison is a chimera. The threat first received a public airing on March 7 when Senator Henry Jackson (Democrat, Washington) told a television interviewer, "The Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advance generation, of offensive systems."

Three days later in a television interview, Mr Laird said that the silo construction "confirmed the fact that the Soviet

Union is going forward with construction of a large missile system. We cannot tell at this time whether it is a modified version of the SS9 ... or whether it is an entirely new missile system."

A month later in a speech to the American Newspaper Publishers' Association, Mr Laird said the US had fresh intelligence "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new, and apparently expensive, ICBM construction programme."

The net effect of the missile scare was neatly summed up in evidence yesterday to the Senate appropriations committee by a former CIA and disarmament agency official. Dr Herbert Scoville, chairman of the strategic weapons committee of the Federation of American Scientists, said that if as now seemed likely the Soviet Union was only hardening its missile sites, this would indicate that it was not seeking a first strike capability. "We must ask ourselves," he told the committee, "how many times we are going to allow the weaponers to come before the Congress and the people shouting 'missile gap' when in reality they are only creating another credibility gap."

-27 MAY 1971

Russian Silos Grow, and U.S. Wonders Why

Washington, May 26 (News Bureau)—Missile silos under construction in the Soviet Union may mean that the Russians are working on two new offensive missile systems, instead of just one, a Defense Department spokesman said today.

The spokesman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jerry W. Friedheim, said this conclusion was drawn from analysis of the work being done on about 60 new intercontinental ballistic (ICBM) silos being built in the Soviet Union. The new launch holes are bigger than any seen before by U.S. spy satellites.

Survive Attack

He said that evidence gathered this month indicates that the Soviets "may be involved in two separate systems of silo improvement." These possible "improvements" include either new missiles or the development of "hardened" silos so existing missiles would be more able to survive an attack.

"Our best judgment remains that we would expect to see new missiles or improvements of existing missiles," Friedheim said. "We are not certain what the Soviets' intentions are."

Discusses CIA Report

Friedheim was commenting on reports that the Central Intelligence Agency believed two-thirds of the new silos were simply more attack-proof holes for existing missiles. Friedheim said the CIA and Pentagon have no differences in their intelligence assessments.

Initially, intelligence experts estimated that because the holes were of greater diameter than any seen in the past, they were designed for a missile bigger than the Russian SS-9—now the world's largest ICBM—or for a version of the SS-9 that might carry a multiple warhead.

Sen. Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who first reported the new silos March 7, said the Soviets were developing a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems.

In an April 22 speech, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird reported fresh evidence "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program."

Friedheim took a much more cautious approach.

"We said very early in this discussion . . . that we were not certain what the Soviets' intentions are," Friedheim said. "And that remains our best assessment."

27 MAY 1971

New Soviet Silo Building Seen As Protection for Two Missiles

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon said yesterday that the new, large missile silos being built in the Soviet Union now appear to be designed for two different kinds of ICBMs, but conceded that more than half of the new holes may be for the relatively small and less threatening SS-11 ICBM.

Defense officials said that new intelligence gathered since late last month indicated that the silo building program—which touched off scares here of a new arms race—may be meant in part to provide better protection for Russian missiles, both the SS-11s and the huge SS-9s, against U.S. attack rather than as a big expansion of the Soviet SS-9 force.

However, Pentagon spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim made it clear that the Pentagon's "best judgment remains that either new missiles or modifications of existing missiles" will go into the "two separate systems of silo improvement."

Privately, Defense officials say they believe the most likely prospect now is that the Soviets will combine their silo hardening effort with installation of improved versions of both missiles, rather than with any completely new ICBM even bigger and more ominous than the existing SS-9.

Of some 60 new ICBM silos that U.S. spy satellites have spotted since this February, well-informed defense officials say that 20 to 25 are under construction in missile fields normally associated with existing SS-9 bases and 35 to 40 at SS-11 bases. No missiles have actually been installed in any of the new holes so far, the officials say.

Friedheim yesterday explained that the original detection of the new silos showed "diameters large enough to encompass any missile in the Soviet inventory."

Disclosure of the new silos was first made publicly on March 7 by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), and was later confirmed by Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird.

While the Pentagon has said all along that it was not sure if the holes were for a completely new missile or for a modification of the existing SS-9, the impression was generally created that whatever it was, it was very big. It is the SS-9, equipped with multiple warheads, which the Pentagon has portrayed as the major threat to knocking out U.S. Minuteman ICBMs in a surprise attack.

There was no official indication given until yesterday that the new holes might be for protecting small ICBMs as well.

The SS-11 carries a much smaller warhead than the SS-9 and is not viewed as a first-strike weapon.

Friedheim said that while it was still unclear what Soviet intentions were "new information now available to us leads us to conclude the Soviets may be involved in two separate silo improvement programs" rather than just one.

The new evidence, other sources say, was photos of different size protective concrete liners for the missile silos which reduce their inside diameters and of different base layouts used for the two missiles.

Friedheim said that in the past the Russians have installed SS-11 ICBMs into what heretofore have been bases used exclusively for shorter range missile.

Privately, Defense officials conceded that the latest developments, if they do not change, are less provocative than a big Soviet drive to add still larger missiles. Splitting the new silos between SS-9s and SS-11s also seems to fit in with U.S. objectives at the strategic arms limitation talks.

Washington hopes to hold down the number of Soviet SS-9s to about 300.

The Soviets now have almost 283 SS-9s on the firing line and presumably will add 20 to 25 more in the new silos.

Friedheim denied there had been disagreement between the CIA and the Pentagon over assessing the meaning of the silo construction program in recent weeks.

Nevertheless, Sen. William Proxmire (D-Wis.) yesterday called the episode the "the shortest missile gap in history."

Proxmire accused both Laird and Jackson of whipping up "a series of scare 'em stories" based on the "wholly unproved assumption that these holes were all designed for the huge new 25-megaton SS-9 missiles."

"The lesson is clear," Proxmire contended. "The practice of selective disclosure of partially analyzed intelligence data by the Pentagon and its allies should stop. Congress and the American public must not be swept off their feet by leaks designed merely to propagandize for a bigger and fatter military budget."

STATINTL

C.I.A. SAID TO DOUBT PENTAGON'S VIEW ON MISSILE THREAT

Senate G.O.P. Sources Say
Agency Thinks Soviet Silos
Are for Existing Arms

PROTECTIVE STEP SEEN

Moscow Is Believed to Be
'Hardening' Installations
for Its SS-11's

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 25 — Senate Republican sources reported today that the Central Intelligence Agency concluded that at least two-thirds of the large new silo holes recently detected in the Soviet Union were intended for the relatively small SS-11 intercontinental missile and not for a large new weapon as the Defense Department has suggested.

This assessment casts a different light on Moscow's strategic intentions at a crucial time in the negotiations with the Soviet Union to achieve some limitation on defensive and offensive strategic weapons.

It now appears to some arms control specialists that the Soviet Union, rather than seeking to achieve a first-strike capability against the United States with large new missiles, is following the American course of trying to protect its missiles against attack with "hardened" silos.

60 New Silos Detected

Some 60 large new missile silos in the Soviet Union have been detected in recent months by means of reconnaissance satellites. The C.I.A. was said to have concluded that at least two-thirds were intended for the SS-11 intercontinental missile, which is comparable to the Minuteman ICBM of the United States.

Some non-Governmental sources with access to Central Intelligence Agency information said that all but 15 of the new holes were situated in existing SS-11 missile fields.

The Senate Republican sources said they had been informed of the C.I.A. assessment by non-Governmental arms control experts who earlier had been briefed by the intelligence agency. These sources declined to be identified by name.

The Defense Department declined today to comment on the reported C.I.A. assessment because, as a department spokesman put it, "We would not have any comment on a speculative report like that."

But the spokesman said the department still held to the interpretation that the Soviet Union was deploying a modified version of its large SS-9 intercontinental missile or an entirely new missile system.

Much of the concern and speculation over the intended purpose for the new silos has sprung from their unusual size.

According to data obtained by the satellites, the holes were larger than those that had previously been dug for the SS-9, a large intercontinental missile that Defense Department officials have suggested the Soviet Union may be deploying as a "first strike" weapon against the United States's Minuteman force. This in turn gave rise to official speculation that the Soviet Union was planning to deploy an improved version of the SS-9 or perhaps an even larger, more powerful weapon.

Senator Henry M. Jackson, who first disclosed the detection of the new silo holes on a national television program March 7, said at the time that "the Russians are now in the process of deploying a new generation, an advanced generation of offensive systems." The Washington Democrat, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described the development as "ominous indeed."

The Defense Department took a somewhat more cautious interpretation, saying that it had detected new ICBM construction but was not sure what the Soviet Union's intentions were.

But in a television appearance on March 10, Melvin R. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, said that the silo construction "confirms the fact that the Soviet Union is going forward with construction of a large missile system."

"We cannot tell at this time whether it is a modified version of the SS-9... or whether it is an entirely new missile system," he said.

Secretary Gives Warning

Then, in a speech April 22 before the American Newspaper Publishers Association, Mr. Laird said the United States had fresh intelligence information "confirming the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program."

He warned that if this Soviet missile build-up continued, the Defense Department might find it necessary to seek a supplementary appropriation for more strategic weapons.

Last week, Administration officials were reported to have said that the Soviet Union was pressing ahead with its new missile program so rapidly that test firings of an improved SS-9 or an entirely new and larger missile were expected by this summer.

On the basis of new intelligence information, the C.I.A. was said today to have concluded that the larger holes could be explained not by a Soviet move to a larger missile but by an engineering step intended to protect the existing Soviet missile force.

According to the intelligence agency's analysis, the larger holes can be explained as an effort to "harden the silos, by emplacement of a concrete shell around them, to protect the weapons against the blast effects of a nuclear explosion. The larger hole is required to accommodate the concrete liners, according to the C.I.A. analysis.

Old Missile Fields Utilized

It was said that the first evidence that the Soviet Union might be "hardening" its missile sites rather than developing a new missile system appeared in the fact that the new holes were detected primarily in existing SS-11 missile fields.

If the Soviet Union was deploying a new weapon, it presumably would not situate the new missile emplacements among older missiles, according to the C.I.A. view.

The conclusive piece of evidence was said to have been received early last week when reconnaissance satellite pictures were received showing silo liners arriving at the missile holes. The photographs were said to have indicated that the liners at neither the SS-11 nor the SS-9 sites were big enough to accommodate larger missiles.

sites did not seem intended for weapons of altered design.

The United States started hardening its Minuteman silos some years ago as it saw the Soviet Union expanding its ICBM forces, and then began "superhardening" them as the Soviet Union began deploying the SS-9 missile.

Some arms control specialists now maintain that the Soviet Union now is turning to hardening its SS-11 and SS-9 missiles as it sees the United States deploying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles, or multiple warheads, known as MIRV's, which potentially could acquire the accuracy to strike precisely at Soviet missile sites.

This was a point made today before the Senate Appropriations Committee by Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr., a former official of the C.I.A. and the Disarmament and Arms Control Agency, now chairman of the Strategic Weapons Committee of the Federation of American Scientists.

A hardening of the Soviet missile sites, he observed "would not contribute to a first-strike capability and, if anything, would be an indication that a first strike was not a critical Soviet policy objective."

If it now turns out that the Soviet Union is only hardening the SS-9 and SS-11 missile silos, he said, "We must ask ourselves how many times we are going to allow the 'weaponers' to come before the Congress and the people shouting 'missile gap,' when in reality they are only creating another 'credibility gap.'"

STATINTL

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Pentagon Peephole

By Jack Anderson

The word has come down from the highest Pentagon levels to find the culprits who have been leaking us information on some of the military's most secret (and most embarrassing) adventures.

Investigators have been busy grilling suspects behind the doors of room 3E993 at the Pentagon.

The gumshoes are most concerned about a series of columns we wrote which they believe were based on secret communications intended for the "eyes only" of such bigwigs as President Nixon's foreign policy sage, Henry Kissinger, and the Joint Chiefs'

chairman, Adm. Thomas Moorer.

The brass hats are particularly redfaced about our recent report that they have been intercepting South Vietnamese President Thieu's private communications, which are decoded by the National Security Agency and passed on to the White House and other agencies. The messages are identified by code name "Gout."

The U.S. is able to pick them up because South Vietnam uses American-made code machines, and U.S. intelligence experts are familiar with their construction and wiring.

The military brass also are upset over our discovery that Admiral Moorer received a "flash" message after the abortive Son Tay prisoner rescue mission which said the North Vietnamese prison compound had not been occupied for three months.

The Pentagon would also like to know how we learned that Air Force planes had been seeding the clouds over the Ho Chi Minh trail network to make the monsoon seasons even rainier. This novel means of flooding the enemy supply line is known as operation "Intermediary-Compatriot."

Lax Security

Actually, the Pentagon shouldn't be surprised that some secrets are getting out. For some of the highest officials have become extremely

Although he vigorously denied it, insiders say Paul Kearney, assistant to Joint Chiefs' Chairman Moorer, has sometimes phoned the Defense Intelligence Agency communications center on unsecured phone lines and had top-secret information read to him.

Men on duty in the communications center have reminded him that he was using an unsecured line. But he has dismissed their warnings, say insiders, with such comments as, "We aren't worried about that."

Also, admirals and generals receive telephone calls at home from the Defense Intelligence Agency when an important secret message has come in for them after hours. Rather than go to the Pentagon, the lazy brass frequently have the sensitive messages read to them.

Another possible source of leaks is the haphazard way in which copies of top-secret messages are finally taken away to be burned. They are put in large, candy-striped bags which may remain in a communications center for weeks until they are filled.

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STATINTL

Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Intelligence Boss Is Needed



THE TROUBLE with the intelligence service of the United States is that it has no commander. This is the point perceived by President Nixon during a recent secret White House briefing at which the President literally threw up his hands in a display of impatience at the vast, expensive and complicated bureaucracy which had been described.

The President had asked for the briefing because of three recent and irritating intelligence failures.

The first was at Sontay, in North Vietnam, where the Army mounted a dangerous operation to recover prisoners who weren't there.

Second was the failure to learn that the North Vietnamese were using the Port of Sihanoukville in Cambodia as a vast supply center—a fact discovered only after we barged into Cambodia thinking the supply center was somewhere else.

Third was the failure of the U.S. command in South Vietnam to forecast the speed with which the North Vietnamese could send reinforcements into Laos, and the Army's failure to estimate how many South Vietnamese ground troops and American airmen would be needed to do the job.

ALL THESE failures caused the President to ask for a clear explanation of how our intelligence system

works—and why it sometimes doesn't work. What he received was an accurate account of confusion.

The first point Mr. Nixon learned is that the \$2 billion-a-year intelligence effort is not commanded but coordinated. Richard Helms, a careful objective analyst, commands CIA but not the Defense Department's intelligence arm, which is headed by Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett. General Bennett, in turn, doesn't really command his own forces because he is often dealing with intelligence requests from officers who outrank him and whose wishes must be regarded as orders.

Thus compromise frequently substitutes for decision in determining Defense Department intelligence priorities. Bennett must try to satisfy an admiral who insists that developments in submarine detection must come first, a general who is more interested in the thickness of Soviet armor, and an Air Force man who insists on priority for new developments in the Soviet SAM. Helms must balance all this with the importance of finding out what the Russians are putting in their ICBM bases and why.

Nobody is boss. Nominally, Helms is "coordinator" of the intelligence effort, but since most of the

money for intelligence comes through the Department of Defense, there is a natural inclination to tell the coordinator how the money should be spent.

PRESIDENT NIXON would like to bring Helms into the White House. That is usually the first thought of the boss who wants a clear picture of what he may have to deal with, and one man to whom he can turn to get it. But if Helms makes this move, he will have to give up running the Central Intelligence Agency, where he first made his mark as a master of spy networks and into which he has brought both order and a healthy sense of restraint. (It was not Helms' wish to involve the CIA in Laos.)

With Helms in the White House, the intelligence effort would soon be domi-

nated by the Defense Department. On the basis of recent performance, this would be a disaster. Former CIA Director John McCone, who was also asked to move to the White House, argued that he would become merely a go-between while the agency he commanded withered into an anachronism, much as the State Department has withered with the advent of resident foreign affairs aides.

One compromise open to the President is to give Lt. Gen. Bennett another star, thus putting him on an equal footing with those who are asking him to make their priorities his own. But if this President—or any other—really wants a better intelligence system, he will eventually have to put somebody in charge.

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John P. Roche

U.S. Intelligence A Failure in Asia

STATINTL

THERE IS A good deal of talk here about President Nixon's plans to reorganize our foreign intelligence services. According to one account, the President was infuriated by the Defense Intelligence Agency's misreading of Hanoi's probable response to the Laotian incursion. "Hanoi threw 35,000 men of four divisions against the 17,000 in ARVN," an intelligence source told the Times' Benjamin Welles. "They stripped North Vietnam of troops, gambling that the United States wouldn't invade the North—and they were right. Their estimates were better than ours."

This allegation, if verified, should not only lead to the reorganization of our intelligence structure, but should generate the instant dismissal of everyone in the DIA who had a hand in preparing the estimate. The notion that Hanoi was going to hold back its strategic reserve to counter a possible invasion was simply preposterous. It could only have been made by men without the slightest understanding of, or respect for, the intelligence of the enemy.

Indeed, this has been one of the curses of the war. From the outset, military strategy was formulated on an appalling underestimation of Hanoi's determination and capacity. While they would, of course, deny it today, Washington was in 1964-65 full of optimistic technocrats who were certain that Ho Chi Minh would collapse with fright the first time an F-105 buzzed Hanoi. The strategy of bombing North Vietnam was thought of as a way of preventing a war, as a technique of scaring the North off South Vietnam.

WHEN ONE CRITIC opposed the bombing strategy in an article in The Washington Post in the spring of 1965, he was informed on a

background basis by high State Department and Pentagon figures that his somber pessimism was unjustified. He was told that he simply didn't appreciate the virtues of air power. When he argued that Ho Chi Minh was not the chief of a primitive hill tribe, but a totalitarian genius dedicated to conquering all of former French Indochina, at whatever cost, these briefers obviously wrote him off as an ideological nut. He was informed that the "intelligence community" (which presumably excluded ideological nuts) was in full agreement that the North Vietnamese response to the bombing would be "defensive."

In 1971 the same crew seems to be calling the shots. Let us look for a minute at the view from Hanoi of the Laotian incursion. Hanoi has political experts who follow American opinion (in fact, one of their best men holds a Ph.D. in political science from a distinguished American university). Suppose you put the question to Hanoi's American desk: "How would the Americans react to an invasion of North Vietnam?" After the Cambodian convulsion, it would hardly take a Ph.D. in political science to answer that one.

SO THEN YOU go down the hall to the military intelligence division and ask its members: "Do the Americans and South Vietnamese have the assets for an invasion of North Vietnam?" Since they can count, they can make an extremely accurate assessment of our order of battle. Taking into consideration the rapid decrease in American combat troops, the ARVN operations in Cambodia, and other facts about the state of combat readiness of various ARVN divisions, it is not hard to guess their reply: "The use of crack

troops for the Laotian incursion has eliminated any possibility of a diversionary maneuver into the North."

Of course, in a rather pathetic exercise in psychological warfare, President Thieu in Saigon made noises about invading the North. However, far from influencing Hanoi, all that Thieu did was to arouse the doves in the United States. In the event what Gen. Giap did was to strip North Vietnam of its strategic reserve and throw the whole force into containing ARVN in Laos. It probably cost him a good deal in manpower—he had to bunch his forces where our planes could get at them—but in political terms it was probably worth it. Laos got billed as an American defeat, as a failure of Vietnamization. In fact, it was an inexcusable failure in American intelligence.

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CHICAGO, ILL.

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S - 697,966

MAY 16 1971

Charles Bartlett's notes**Nixon on blacks': deadline**

WASHINGTON — President Nixon is making it a point to meet the deadline set by the 13 black legislators for an answer to their demands for more help to the urban poor. On Monday he will respond, item by item, to the 60 proposals advanced by the Black Caucus. He will not turn them all down, but he can't promise much because the cost of the blacks' program is estimated by budget officials at between \$87.5 million and \$105 million. The President is, however, eager to convince the Rockefeller wing of the GOP that he is sympathetic to the problems of the black minority.

Image remakers

THE WHITE HOUSE is still seeking solutions to what it regards as the President's image problem. A new assistant is being sought to serve as the domestic equivalent to John Scali, who is advising the President on how to improve his public relations in the foreign-policy area. Meanwhile, Charles Colson, a high-ranking aide, is collecting ideas on how to improve Mr. Nixon's projection on television.

Fly in ointment

THE PRESIDENT has been cautious in responding to solicitations from former President Lyndon B. Johnson for official participation in the Johnson Library dedication on May 22. Mr. Johnson asked him to fly some 500 of his guests down to Austin in Air Force jets, but the President, apprised that the cost of each plane would be \$8,000 out of his contingency fund, has so far balked. He is afraid there will be an adverse public reaction. So one group of 100 Johnson associates has chartered a Braniff Airlines plane, and others will go on regularly scheduled carriers.

Bees' needs

NATURE NOTES: The House just passed, without dissent, an administration proposal that beekeepers be awarded \$3.5 million in indemnity payments for damage done to their honey and bees by insecticides . . . White House gardeners, who developed a colorful array of flowering plants for table decorations in the Johnson era, are restrained now by Mrs. Nixon's taste. She has a strong preference for using only red flowers.

Pollution standards abroad

U.S. officials are working hard to impose U.S. pollution and safety standards on foreign countries so that U.S. manufacturers will not face a competitive disadvantage in foreign trade. A total of 11 U.S. ecology specialists flew to Prague last week for a conference on European pollution problems. Identical air-monitoring systems have been set up in St. Louis, Ankara and Frankfurt as part of a health study. The Japanese public's sudden concern with pollution promises that manufacturers there will not escape the added costs.

Bigger role for Helms?

Mr. Nixon has not decided how much of a reorganization he wants in the intelligence community, but it seems likely that he will give Richard Helms, Central Intelligence Agency director, some co-ordinating authority over budgets that pay for intelligence activities in the Defense Department. The President's agreement to have Helms address the editors convention here in April is taken as a sign that he means to move Helms into a more prominent role.

JOURNAL

MAY 14 1971

M - 66,673

S - 209,501

A Single Agency

A major reorganization of the nation's overseas intelligence services is under consideration at the White House, and the sooner the job is done, the better for the country. The precise outlines of the overhaul are not yet clear, but it is obvious that Mr. Nixon is determined to improve intelligence services while cutting high operational costs.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the most prominent of the federal agencies which collect and analyze foreign intelligence. But there are five other agencies involved in similar work. The total annual bill for all six agencies runs to about five billion dollars; about 200,000 persons are involved, mostly in the armed services.

A study made for the President includes a recommendation for the creation of a Cabinet-level intelligence department; it also includes provisions for tightening CIA's oversight of intelligence work done for the ~~armed services~~ in the Defense Department. It is plain that any reorganization will run squarely into operation of long-established vested interests.

There is a superficial attraction to the idea of creating a Secretary of Intelligence, but does the task of correlating overseas intelligence work rate a Cabinet post? It would seem that such a service is intended to provide information to all major agencies of government and, as such, might more properly be made a White House staff function.

Assigning the CIA primacy among the intelligence agencies is certain to run into opposition, particularly from military service agencies. But somehow, the goal of cooperation must be fixed and enforced in place of what must often be almost cutthroat competition among the six agencies for money, staff, and authority.

Congressional opposition or suspicion of a presidential effort to centralize the overseas intelligence services might be blunted if Mr. Nixon accompanied his executive order with a proposal for appointment of a joint congressional committee, such as the Atomic Energy Committee, to oversee the intelligence gathering services for the legislative branch.

Mr. Nixon will not have an easy time in the proposed reorganization, no matter what may be the precise nature of administrative reforms. But reforms are needed; in fact, they have long been overdue. A single agency, coordinating all intelligence work overseas effectively for the President and his Cabinet, is essential to the national security.

STATINTL

SALEM, ORE.
STATESMAN

M - 34,974 MAY 14 1971
S - 35,572

The high cost of intelligence

The U.S. government spends an estimated \$5 billion annually gathering intelligence all over the world.

President Nixon has serious doubts about whether we are getting our money's worth, reports *The New York Times*. He is considering various ideas to reorganize our various global information collection efforts.

The Central Intelligence Agency, a civilian organization, is our prime means of gathering strategic information throughout the world. But much of the intelligence effort is carried out through the Defense Intelligence Agency and 150,000 men assigned to intelligence branches of the various armed services.

The \$5 billion cost figure is only a very rough estimate. The government never reveals intelligence spending publicly, in order to deny this information to potential enemies. As a result, only a handful of our congressmen and hardly any ordinary citizens know much about our intelligence activities.

The President reportedly is concerned about the quality of our intelligence effort as well as its cost. *The Times* says he wasn't happy about two recent intelligence failures, which probably is an understatement. One was the

work that preceded that abortive prisoner camp raid deep into North Vietnam last November, when the raiders discovered the prisoners hadn't been in the camp for some time. The other was the great underestimate of North Vietnam's ability to counter that South Vietnamese move into Laos.

Good foreign intelligence is of extreme importance to the U.S. It can mean the difference between preventing and blundering into a war. It can prevent serious mistakes our government otherwise might make on a long list of subjects — everything up to and including the question of what new weapons systems we should be developing to protect our country from which potential threats. It's a prerequisite to meaningful arms control, for example, which if achieved might save us several times the cost of all intelligence work.

So if it takes \$5 billion per year to keep our government well informed about seeds of actions taking place all over the globe, we'll not complain.

But both the size of the price tag and some of the recent fumbles make us suspect that the President's critical review is very much in order.

STATINTL

SCRANTON, PA.
TRIBUNE
M - 34,458
SCRANTONIAN
S - 47,518
MAY 12 1971

Our Intelligence Agencies

All Presidents have been misled at one time or another by faulty intelligence reports. President Nixon has been irritated in recent months by two examples of shoddy intelligence work.

Last November, inferior intelligence resulted in the abortive prison camp raid at Sontay, North Vietnam. The staging of the raid was an example of fine planning, but the raiders found no American prisoners to rescue. The prisoners had been shifted elsewhere and our intelligence sources failed to report the move.

The incursion into Laos earlier this year by the South Vietnamese Army met massive resistance, all because our intelligence sources failed to pick up Hanoi's moves to implement forces in the field in Laos.

President Nixon is now said to be considering a major reorganization of the nation's foreign intelligence activities to improve output and cut costs. There are several options the President can follow. One is creation of a Cabinet-level department of intelligence. Another is strengthening the authority of the director of the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency over the global operations of the Pentagon and other intelligence agencies.

The United States has a far-flung intelligence network that costs taxpayers about \$5 billion annually to maintain. Many Presidents have bemoaned the fact that intelligence reporting has been rather erratic despite the money pumped into the program.

The Central Intelligence Agency is the largest of the agencies specializing in intelligence activities. But there are other bureaus performing similar services, five of them with overseas ties. At least 200,000 are employed in the intelligence agencies.

Many observers feel the President must take action through an executive order defining the authority of Richard Helms, director of the CIA. The authority of Helms is rather imprecise at this point. The move could strengthen the CIA director's authority over such intelligence-gathering agencies as the Pentagon, State Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Whether such a solution is a viable one would remain to be seen.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Adm. Moorer Aids Inter-Agency Spies

By Jack Anderson

International espionage is seldom as efficient as the inter-departmental spying that goes on in Washington.

The rivalry between some government departments is so intense that they spy on one another like suspicious spouses. The armed forces, for instance, watch each other jealously. The Central Intelligence Agency never makes a move without the Defense Intelligence Agency keeping close surveillance. And when a State Department employee enters the Pentagon he takes the same precautions as if he were entering enemy territory.

No daily document is more sensitive than "The President's Daily Intelligence Briefing," which the CIA prepares for President Nixon. It is loaded with SI (Special Intelligence) items, country by country, on long sheets tucked into a white folder with blue lettering.

To possess a copy of the President's private intelligence digest is the ultimate status symbol. Those who see it are men of consequence, indeed. But for the DIA, which is eager to know what the CIA knows, access to this exclusive document is a matter of utmost priority.

Our own spies tell us that

the DIA regularly gets a copy. It is smuggled to them by Adm. Thomas Moorer, the joint chiefs' chairman, who has sufficient standing to get on the distribution list.

To make unauthorized copies of this sensitive presidential digest is akin to counterfeiting holy writ. Yet our spies have spotted a Moorer aide, who is entrusted with the admiral's eyes-only messages, furtively running off copies on a DIA copying machine.

Another supersecret document is the State Department's intelligence round-up from embassies around the world. The department guards this so jealously that it is stamped, "NODIS," which means it isn't supposed to be distributed outside State's own elite.

What they don't know, however, is that a Pentagon pigeon in their midst runs off unauthorized copies and sneaks them in a plain brown manila envelope to the joint chiefs chairman and the DIA director.

Thus do government agencies, in the best cloak-and-dagger tradition, snoop upon one another.

The proposed legislation would permit the court to make discretionary allowances not to exceed \$150 for a receiver and \$250 for a trustee in those cases where the distribution is too small to provide an adequate basis for computing a reasonable allowance for the necessary services rendered.

Under this proposed legislation, the maximum allowances which are at present permitted for a trustee will be applicable to receivers. This will represent an increase in the percentage rates for receivers and also have the effect of increasing, for receivers, the range of the application of the higher rates to the medium and larger distributions.

The maximum allowances for trustees have been increased, with this proposal, by increasing the range in which the rates for a trustee are applicable.

The proposed increase in the custodial rate would make it unnecessary for the referee to enlarge the duties of the receiver in order to fairly compensate him for his services.

The proposed increases would apply only in bankruptcy cases initiated subsequent to the enactment of the proposed legislation.

The above bill was approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States at its October 1970 session.

By Mr. BURDICK:

S. 1396. A bill to amend section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U.S.C. 63) and sections 631 and 634 of title 28, United States Code, to permit full-time referees in bankruptcy to perform the duties of a U.S. magistrate. Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, I introduce for appropriate reference, S. 1396, to amend the Bankruptcy Act to permit full-time referees in bankruptcy to perform the duties of a U.S. magistrate.

The Federal Magistrates Act, approved October 17, 1963, 32 Stat. 1107, provides that with the approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States "a part-time referee in bankruptcy—may be appointed to serve as a part-time magistrate," and authorizes the Conference to "fix the aggregate amount of compensation to be received for performing the duties of part-time magistrate and part-time referee in bankruptcy" 28 U.S.C. 634. The act, however, does not authorize a full-time referee in bankruptcy to perform the duties of a part-time U.S. magistrate. In addition, section 35 of the Bankruptcy Act, pertaining to qualifications for referees in bankruptcy, provides in part that an individual shall not be eligible for appointment as a referee unless he is "not holding any office of profit or emolument under the laws of the United States or of any State or subdivision thereof other than conciliation commissioner or special master under this title." Exceptions to this provision are made only in the case of a part-time referee in bankruptcy.

In the design and organization of the new system of U.S. magistrates two difficulties have arisen which would be ameliorated in part if a full-time referee in bankruptcy were authorized to perform the duties of a U.S. magistrate.

First, there is the problem of a "back-up" for a magistrate who is ill, or temporarily away from his station on business or vacation. Some courts have requested authority to appoint a second part-time magistrate at some locations at a nominal salary to arraign defendants and set bail in the absence of the regular magistrate—a function which a full-time referee in bankruptcy might well perform. Second, certain language in the Magistrates Act and in the Bankruptcy Act seems to prohibit a court from combining a position of part-time referee in bankruptcy with a position of part-time magistrate, in order that it may have one full-time officer rather than two part-time officers. It is the view of the Judicial Conference of the United States and its Committees on Bankruptcy Administration and the Implementation of the Federal Magistrates Act that it would be in the interest of good judicial administration to permit full-time referees in bankruptcy to perform magistrate duties and to authorize a full-time combination position of referee in bankruptcy.

By Mr. CHURCH:

S. 1397. A bill to amend the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 to impose restrictions on information activities outside the United States of Government agencies. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

PROHIBITING THE UNITED STATES FROM ENGAGING IN PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, last year the Committee on Foreign Relations held a series of hearings on the operation of U.S. advisory and assistance programs in Vietnam. The hearings revealed a great deal concerning the nature and extent of our involvement in the internal affairs of that country. Today, I wish to discuss briefly one of the most insidious of those programs and to introduce legislation to correct the underlying policy. I refer to the propaganda services which our Government renders on behalf of Vietnam.

Traditionally, American citizens have viewed with great suspicion anything that suggests the creation of an official Government information agency. And rightfully so. They realize that Government information programs cannot be divorced from political propaganda designed to serve partisan or personal purposes. Germany's experience under Goebbels lingers in the American memory.

Yet in Vietnam the U.S. Information Agency, which was created to promote better understanding of our country abroad, is now engaged in a massive campaign, using every tool of the communication arts, to sell the Thieu Government to the people of Vietnam. Through television and radio, and newspapers, magazines, and leaflets by the tens of millions, the USIA is teamed up with military psychological warfare specialists to inflict on the people of Vietnam the kind of official propaganda system that we refuse to allow in our own country. It is the ultimate corrup-

tion in a war which has for years now eroded the moral sensibilities of our Nation.

Our Vietnam policymakers under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon have assured the American people that all we seek for South Vietnam is the right of "self-determination." But is "self-determination" really possible as long as the United States spends millions of dollars in promoting the interests of the government in power in Vietnam, doing everything possible to convince the Vietnamese people that the Thieu government is their friend and protector? When the Vietcong and North Vietnamese view the magnitude of the U.S. propaganda and aid effort in Vietnam, there is little wonder that they are skeptical about repeated promises of free elections. I think my colleagues are generally aware of the importance of the mass media in election campaigns. Does anyone believe that opposition candidates, assuming that genuine opposition candidates are allowed, will be given equal time and treatment on Vietnamese radio and television or in the other U.S.-financed information programs, when the basic purpose of all these programs has been to win the Vietnamese people over to the Thieu government's side.

It is all very well to call for free and open elections; it is an appealing slogan. But when it comes to specifics as to who controls the campaign machinery, the mass media, and the election process, "free and open" is likely to look very much like "government controlled." Lack of credibility as to U.S. intentions has always been a major problem in communicating with the other side. The contrast between what is said by our Government concerning free elections and what we, in fact, do in promoting the interests of President Thieu demonstrates that the problem is far from being resolved. The United States should make it clear to all concerned that it will take a strictly neutral position in the coming election in Vietnam. To do so it must gear its activities to aiding the people, not the government. One of the most obvious ways to demonstrate neutrality is to cease assisting the Thieu government on propaganda programs.

Mr. President, since I was first elected to the Senate, I have told the people of Idaho that I would not support legislation which would authorize the Federal Treasury to pay the campaign expenses of nationally elected officials. I do not feel that the taxpayers of this Nation should support my campaigns or the campaigns of others for public office. I feel even more strongly that our Nation's taxpayers should not provide support to foreign political leaders in their attempts to gain favor with their own people.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record following my remarks the transcript of the Foreign Relations Committee hearing of March 19, 1970, concerning USIA operations in Vietnam. Nowhere in that act is there authority, direct or indirect, for any government agency to engage in a propaganda campaign to increase understanding between a foreign government and the people it governs. The simple fact is

8 MAR 1977

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How Army Viewed Spy Activities

BY WILLIAM KLING

(Chicago Tribune Press Service)

WASHINGTON, March 7 — How the Army viewed its spying on civilians, officially admitted by the Defense Department last week, is now public.

The scope and direction of the spying, as well as the reason some elected public officials, newsmen and prominent persons came under the scrutiny of intelligence agents, are reflected in the Army's civil disturbance information collection plan.

The 35-page document, drafted in 1968 with the cooperation of the Johnson administration's White House and Justice Department staffs, was rescinded by the Army last June 9 and unclassified by the Defense Department on Feb. 24.

Approach to Mission

It tells how the Army approached its mission—the gathering of intelligence information to prepare for possible troop suppression of urban riots—and why, as Robert S. Froehke, assistant defense secretary for administration, told a Senate subcommittee last Tuesday, the Army became “overly enthusiastic” about the task.

“The current civil disturbance situation dictates a change in the degree to which the Army must seek advance information concerning potential and probable trouble areas and trouble makers,” said the document, dated May 2, 1968, and issued by the Army's then intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. William P. Yarborough.

The plan told of the need to know as much as possible about “the wellsprings of violence and the heart and nerve causes of chaos” so that the Army, if it were summoned to restore order during a civil disturbance, would have a clearer idea of what it was facing.

A Better Chance

“To do less means the professional violence purveyors will have a better chance to achieve their end aims—law breaking, chaos, violence, destruction, insurrection, revolution,” the document said.

The document warned, however, that the Army sought “only to collect that ‘information’ needed to exercise honest and sound judgment of the measures to be taken in suppressing rampant violence and restoring order.”

Undercover missions were barred except by “prior approval and direction” of intelligence headquarters. Many were authorized.

Host of Agencies

Taking part in the information gathering were a host of Army and Defense Department agencies, plus Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard intelligence offices, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Subversive Activities Control Board and federal law enforcement and administrative agencies.

Intelligence agents were instructed to look for the presence of militant agitators in riot-prone cities, and increases in weapons thefts, inflammatory propaganda, riot rumors and “activity such as rabble-raising meetings and fiery agitation speeches of extremists [and] civil rights groups.”

Agents were told to seek the “identity of newspapers, radio and television stations, and prominent persons who are friendly with the leaders of the disturbance and are sympathetic with their plans.” Also sought were the identities of army military and civilian personnel “who are or may become involved on the side of the disturbers.”

Spy on Chicagoans

Under this category, the Army kept dossiers on Sen. Stevenson and Rep. Abner J. Mikva, two liberal Chicago Democrats who Froehke admitted Tuesday had been intelligence subjects. Other Chicagoans were spied on as well.

Under “indicators of potential violence,” the Army wanted information on high minority-group unemployment and crime rates, income disparity between social groups, poor police-community relations, racial migration, and the lack of means for minority groups to redress grievances and communicate with police.

Agents were to investigate infiltration by the Communist Party, U. S. A., the American Nazi Party, the Nation of Islam, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Progressive Labor Party.

Aims and Activities

They also were to dig out the “aims and activities of groups attempting to create, prolong or aggravate racial tensions, such as C. O. R. E. [Congress of Racial Equality], N. A. A. C. P. [National Association for the Advancement of Colored People], S. N. C. C. [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee], National States Rights party, Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Council of Federated Organizations.”

Froehke said the Army's spy activities were “unfortunate, but in some cases necessary.”

STATINTL

4 March 1971

ROTC as world tactical squad

STATINTL

by

Jim Gerharter and Mike Blaz

(First of two articles)

The presence of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) on the University campus is a political, not an academic issue. The abolition of ROTC from the University campus is necessary not because ROTC maintains low academic standards, but because the policies it defends and the interests it serves are wrong. Reforms aimed at making ROTC more academically respectable are attempts to conceal the real issue. Third World people are not concerned whether or not it is a properly liberalized cadre which oppresses them; their concern is with the existence of their oppressor, and so our concern should be with ROTC's existence on campus.

The government's policy in Asia, Latin America and Africa has always been integrated with the interests of American corporations; that is, the war in Vietnam is not a "mistake," but part of a larger policy designed to preserve U.S. economic and political control over "under-developed" countries. The military, led into battle by ROTC graduates, protects corporate profits both home and abroad. What the National Guard and other forces of "order" do to black rebellions within this country, ROTC does to Third World people outside the country. The purpose is essentially the same, the target just happens to be further removed.

It is convenient to look at ROTC as a sort of world tactical squad, a cadre of officers trained at universities for the express purpose of insuring control over oppressed countries. ROTC graduates defend the national interest in Southeast Asia in the same manner as the military defends the national interest in the ghettos of this country, by crushing any outcry against racial oppression.

It is important to understand the necessity of ROTC to the military effort, because once this is established it becomes evident why ROTC must be abolished. ROTC recruits and trains junior officers for the U.S. military. It provides the officers to command the troops and therefore is not a mere symbol of the Vietnam war and its horrors, but one of the most vital elements of aggression on oppressed nations throughout the world. Fifty per cent of all Army officers currently on duty are ROTC graduates, 35 per cent of the Navy's and 30 per cent of the Air Force's.

According to the defense department, the number of new male officers sought in the fiscal year 1970 was 57,000. Of this number 23,700 were expected to come from ROTC and related college programs and about 20,300 from Officer Candidate School. With the winding down of the Vietnam war, ROTC now provides 85 per cent of the necessary input of junior officers. The other two ways of getting a commission are relatively nonproductive; with West Point producing only about 1,000 officers a year (at \$50,000 a head) and direct commissions which make up less than 3 per cent.

The figures presented here should be sufficient to refute the argument that ROTC is not an important source of junior imperialists. A widespread anti-ROTC movement could dry up the only significant stable source of officers for the military. Col. Pell, ex-commander of the now defunct Harvard ROTC unit explains the significance of ROTC to the war effort. "Let it be understood beyond question that there is

28 FEB 1971

STATINTL

Bayh Reveals Army Civilian Spy Plan

United Press International

The Army's "civil disturbance information collection plan," a document that apparently served as the rationale for extensive domestic information-gathering by the Army in the late 1960s, was made public last night by Sen. Birch Bayh, D-Ind.

The plan was issued by the office of the assistant chief of staff for intelligence on May 2, 1968, and rescinded last Dec. 14 by Gen. Kenneth G. Wickham, the Army's adjutant general.

In it, more than 3,000 Army intelligence agents were instructed to collect information on "prominent persons" friendly with potential leaders of civil disturbances.

The orders apparently led to collection of dossiers on such prominent people as Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson III, D-Ill., Rep. Abner Mikva, D-Ill., former Illinois

Gov. Otto Kerner, actress Jane Fonda, folk singer Arlo Guthrie and scores of others.

Bayh is a member of the Senate Constitutional Rights subcommittee, which is conducting hearings into the extent of the Army's intelligence-gathering activities.

The Army was given the mission of helping to cope with riots in the late 1960s. Its decision to gather information on potential troublemakers sprang from that mission. The plan declares that to "do the job" it must know in advance as much as possible about the wellsprings of violence.

So broadly did the Army interpret its mandate that intelligence units in Europe and Asia were directed to collect the names, organizations, number of participants and nature of protest activities in support of

"peace" groups "in either Communist or nonCommunist countries," and funnel the information back to headquarters.

Domestically, Army intelligence agents were told to gather information on such matters as:

The identity of newspapers, radio or television stations friendly with potential leaders of civil disturbances.

The "aims and activities of groups attempting to create, prolong or aggravate racial tensions." Among those groups, the document listed the NAACP, the Congress on Racial Equality and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The "high command, composition and structure of headquarters, exact titles, rosters of key personnel" of "dissident groups."

"Efforts by minority groups to

upset the balance of power and the political system."

The "failure of law enforcement agencies to properly respond due to indecision, lack of manpower or fear of public reaction."

"Inequitable law enforcement, real or imagined, towards minority groups."

Such "indicators of potential violence" as "wide disparity of average income between white and discontented nonwhite" and the "migration of large numbers of persons from discontented minority groups into cities."

In addition to depending on its own resources for this type of information, the Army asked other government agencies to contribute what they could gather. Among these agencies were the Central Intelligence Agency, the Subversive Activities Control Board, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Navy and Air Force and others.

At its start, the document carries a disclaimer:

"The Army is well aware that the overwhelming majority in both the anti-war and racial movements are sincere Americans. It also realizes that in both groups there is a small but virulent number who are out to tear America apart. . . . These are the activists that control the violent action."

"... If the Army must be used to quell violence it wants to restore law and order as quickly as possible and return to its normal protective role--to do this it must know in advance as much as possible about the wellsprings of violence and the heart and nerve causes of chaos."

"... The Army seeks only to collect that needed to exercise honest and sound judgment of the measures to be taken in suppressing rampant violence and restoring order. . . ."

Bayh, in a statement, said he was "alarmed by the scope and depth of snooping on peaceful civilians apparent in the plan."

He said he found it "absolutely incredible" that the Army would list the NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as groups attempting to create racial tensions.

Laird Names Civilian as Top Civilian Spy

By DAVID BREASTED

Washington, Feb. 18 (NEWS Bureau)—Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, trying to defuse the uproar over military "spying" on civilians, assigned today direct responsibility for all Pentagon counterintelligence and investigative activities affecting private citizens to one top-level civilian official.

Robert F. Froehlke, assistant defendant secretary for administration, was named for the task. He conceded that overzealous military intelligence branches in the past had generated "grave cause for concern and reason for reorganization" because of their civilian-related activities.

Laird's naming of Froehlke and a defense investigative review council under him also represented a hard-fought compromise at the highest levels of the Pentagon establishment after Laird's indication two months ago that he intended to make all intelligence branches directly answerable to

himself. The Joint Chiefs of Staffs were understood to have vigorously objected to having foreign intelligence reporting, which they maintained was vital to their functions, moved out from under them.

Direct Reports

As a result, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's own CIA for military affairs, continues to report directly to the joint chiefs.

On civilian intelligence aspects, Froehlke said that military intelligence officials had shown "a

tendency to overreact" during the civil disturbance period of the late 1960s, beginning with the Detroit riots of 1967. This counter-intelligence activity, mainly by the Army, led recently to a series of complaints that the military was compiling dossiers on civilians including political figures, such as newly elected Sen. Adlai E. Stevenson 3d (D-Ill.)

However, Froehlke avoided the substance of well-publicized allegations about this, claiming that since the time Laird had ordered the intelligence review, he and his staff "had not had time" to check out the allegations.



Associated Press photo

Assistant Defense Secretary
Robert Froehlke at Pentagon.

18 FEB 1971

Army Plan to Spy on Civilians Was Sent to 319 U.S. Officials

By BEN A. FRANKLIN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 17 —

Representative Ogden R. Reid of Westchester disclosed today that the Army's controversial intelligence surveillance of civilian dissent and political activity was so widely known in government from 1968 on that even the military aides to all 50 state Governors were informed of its scope and operations.

Mr. Reid revealed — with grudging Army permission — the partial contents of the May 2, 1968, intelligence collection plan that started the Army on its two-year program of spying on civilian civil rights workers, anti-war activists and politically active groups and individuals.

The Representative disclosed that a total of 319 Government officials, including the leaders of 19 civilian agencies were aware of the Army's broadly stated intention to spy and gather dossiers on law-abiding civilian activity.

"The remarkable thing about it," Mr. Reid said in an interview, "is that the Army's 1968 intelligence collection plan was distributed to 319 individuals, including the adjutants general of all 50 states, and yet no one had the sense or the courage to question what they were doing."

"To me, it's almost as disturbing that so many remained silent as that this was conceived in the first place," he said.

A partial list of addressees who received the "confidential" civilian intelligence plan was the only part of a thick file of classified Army documents that Mr. Reid could persuade Army officials today to let him discuss with a ques-

tioner.

He said that the list of agencies that received the Army surveillance plan in the spring of 1968 included the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Treasury Department, the Justice Department, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Subversive Activities Control Board and the General Services Administration, among others.

"I think you have to assume that the top people in these agencies didn't see the plan and were not aware of it," Mr. Reid said. "This whole thing burst into life with no top echelon approval that we're aware of. And that's the disturbing thing. It was started at a lower level and it could happen again. The Army was not in this alone."

Representative Reid's authorized disclosure of a paraphrase of part of an Army document came as he released a letter from Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor that acknowledged that "some reports" filed by Army intelligence agents "could have contained the names" of Senator Adlai E. Stevenson 3d, Representative Abner Mikva, Otto Kerner, the former Governor of Illinois, and other Illinois political figures.

The Resor letter, coming to public attention almost on the eve of extensive Senate hearings on charges of unconstitutional Army intelligence surveillance of political and other civilian figures, appeared to go substantially further than earlier Army statements in acknowledging the military's role in the surveillance of civilian political leaders.

STATINTL

13 FEBRUARY 1971

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Defense relations. Nowhere in the Executive branch is the potential for friction in OTP relations more visible than in the Defense Department. "We're very concerned," the Pentagon's David Solomon said. "We really don't know about that office yet."

Solomon showed a reporter a Xerox copy of a letter that OTP sent to Secretary Laird, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, and Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency. OTP had sent a Xerox copy to each of the addressees; the original of the letter had not been sent to anyone.

Solomon said that because of the letter's Xerox form, the Pentagon had routed it to him, rather than to Laird.

"Is this the way to establish respect for your office?" Solomon said indignantly. "This kind of thing isn't done. I would never send out a Xerox letter."

The letter was an affront to the Defense Secretary, he said. "I visualize that we're going to have some problems up there (at OTP)."

Whitehead later defended OTP's action, saying that sending out Xerox copies is standard procedure for the White House when identical letters are sent to more than one person. Another OTP staff member said privately, however, that he would have thought the Defense Secretary was worth something better.

Solomon's boss, Louis deRosa, said, "We have to understand how our missions are different." The Pentagon, deRosa said, must consider issues mostly in terms of national security, while OTP "can be more ethereal."

Solomon and deRosa agree that OTP has a useful and valuable role, however. "We look to that office for guidance and policy and that sort of thing," Solomon said.

DeRosa said in a separate interview: "I look forward to working with those people. I'm sure there will be times I wish the office wasn't there, however. We'll have a few rough spots, but I'm willing to take them."

Despite the friction so far, Whitehead said that he does not feel that his office's relations with the Defense Department are strained. "I can appreciate their apprehension. They don't take kindly to someone from outside telling them what to do."

Whitehead said that there are charges that the Defense Department is wasteful in its use of the radio spectrum, and that the Pentagon is uneasy about them. "These people have a job to do, and they would just prefer to do it without worrying about what they would do for other considerations."

iciencies at the Pentagon, he said, but he made it clear that his office would be looking hard for them.

Mansur, Whitehead's deputy, said that he understands Solomon's concerns about "outside meddling" in Pentagon activities. "It is not our intent to become involved in matters of an operational nature," Mansur said.

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22 FEB 1977

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Chiefs Resist Laird's Plans On Intelligence

By MORTON KONDRACK
Chicago Sun-Times Service

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird reportedly is not succeeding in his effort to wrest full control of the Pentagon's military intelligence apparatus from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Defense Department officials said that new civilian controls will be imposed on domestic intelligence gathering, but not on foreign intelligence, which has more long-range policy importance.

Amid public concern over reports on Army spying on civilian officials, Laird announced on Dec. 23 a plan to place all of military intelligence under civilian control.

He assigned Assistant Defense Secretary Robert F. Froehke to work out details for the takeover and announce the new arrangements by Feb. 1. But that public announcement has been delayed several times — the last time on Wednesday — because of resistance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the full takeover.

Canceled Briefing

Pentagon officials were to have briefed Sen. Sam J. Ervin Jr., D-N.C., on the new plans Wednesday, but they abruptly canceled the meeting and, with it, a press conference scheduled for yesterday.

Public announcement now appears off until at least Feb. 23, three weeks after Laird said it would take place.

Exact details of the "civilianization" of domestic military intelligence were hazy, but they reportedly caused some consolidation of the three intelligence collection services.

Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence services now maintain separate offices in cities around the country. Their main task is to conduct background investigations on persons seeking access to classified information.

As a sidelight, the organizations — especially the Army — became more and more deeply involved in conducting surveillances of left and right-wing political organizations, particularly the anti-war movement.

Total Shakeup

With disclosure that office holders in Illinois had come under Army surveillance, Laird moved for a total shakeup of military intelligence.

Laird said in his statement that, henceforth, the massive Defense Intelligence Agency would report to the defense secretary alone and not to the chiefs as well. The chiefs were specifically prohibited from creating a new intelligence apparatus of their own.


Foreign intelligence — including the size and power of potential enemies — is the data on which key defense decisions are made, including military appropriations and operations. Work-in day-to-day with the military chiefs, the operation is headed by a military man — presently, Lt. Gen. Donald V. Bennett.

After Laird's Dec. 23 announcement, Defense Department officials said they expected him to create a new civilian post of assistant secretary of defense for intelligence either to supervise or replace the military head of DIA.

Any such plan, however, became unstuck owing to determination of the military chiefs to retain control over the Pentagon's intelligence flow.

Had Laird's "civilianization" program gone through, the chiefs would have received intelligence information from the defense secretary. But as matters stand at the moment, they apparently would have equal or greater opportunity to fashion intelligence reports on which decisions are made.

FEB 1971



How the War College Polishes Our Brass

By Julius Duscha

WHEN I GOT IN THE CAB and asked to be taken to the National War College, the driver gave me a funny look, as if I wanted to go to Fort Knox. After I reminded him that the college was down in Southwest at Fort McNair, he nodded and grunted, "Yeah, I remember now."

You seem to be in another world as you leave the modern concrete and glass of Southwest and pass by the brick sentry house and the iron grillwork at the entrance to old Fort McNair, an Army post since 1794 and a highly strategic piece of land because of its commanding down-river view of the Potomac. You go past General's Row where fine old Army-style Colonial houses line the riverbank. And there it is, at the end of the old parade ground, not far from the site of the trial and hanging of Mary Surratt and three other conspirators in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. There is a sense of majesty about the sixty-year-old War College building with its graceful dome and white stone columns setting off the intricacies of its brickwork.

As we pulled up in front of the building, my cab driver leaned across the front seat and read out loud the words chiseled in stone above the entrance: "National War College." He turned to me, shook his head, and said: "All they do is study war in there, huh?"

The name is a problem. The War Department has long since been renamed the Department of the Army. Generals and Defense secretaries have developed all sorts of obfuscating phrases to describe war and warlike actions. But the War College is still stuck with that awful name.

But the National War College is not Bismarck or Clausewitz mit nuclear weapons—although a statue of Frederick the Great once stood at its entrance. Rather, its major purpose is to open a window on the world for highly parochial military officers. Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R001400050001-4

military establishment.

It's a tall order. The men who come through the college each year are in their late thirties and early forties. They are products of a cold-war education. It's always been Us versus Them, and no one needs a scorecard to identify the players.

Every August a class of 140 men arrives at the college. Three-fourths are military officers, generally Army and Air Force colonels and Navy captains. The other fourth is civilian—Foreign Service Officer 2's and 3's from the State Department and GS-15's from the CIA and other agencies.

To the military a year at the War College is what a Nieman-Fellowship at Harvard is to journalists or a Sloan Fellowship at Harvard or Stanford to middle-level executives. It is recognition, a rung up, an eye-catcher on a resume.

For ten months the War College students listen to some 150 off-the-record lectures from people ranging all the way from the President and the Cabinet to bombs-away Air Force generals and cold-war theorists expert in the mysteries of Mao. After hearing a lecture each morning the student body breaks up into small discussion groups supervised by the heavily military-oriented faculty of about forty men.

The faculty members also oversee political-military simulations (What would you do if the Russians seized the Dardanelles?) and research papers (American Policy in Southeast Asia During the 1980's).

The student's year is divided into twelve parts, each constituting a course such as National Power in the Modern World, Military Strategy, Problems of Modernization, and Internal Defense. There is nothing in the curriculum about building bigger bombs, but as one would expect in a college directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff everything is ultimately brought back to the question of the feasibility of military solutions to the

world's problems.

In the last few years, apparently feeling that the military's most relevant role may not be in Europe or the Middle East or Southeast Asia, the War College has revised its curriculum to include considerable emphasis on the New Left and other potential threats to our internal security. I came away from the War College with the uneasy feeling that the officers there see a military solution to the inconvenience caused by dissent in our society.

The National War College was set up by the Joint Chiefs in 1946 to fill the need "for comprehensive education in the formulation and implementation of national security policies and strategies of a highly select group of senior officers from each of the military services and civilian government agencies." Dwight Eisenhower, James Forrestal, George Marshall, and Hap Arnold have all been credited with starting the college, which was modeled after the British Imperial Defence College and was housed in what had been the headquarters of the Army War College. The Army, Navy, and Air Force still have their own War Colleges, but these rival institutions are more concerned with nuts-and-bolts military operations and none looks at grand strategic concepts the way the National War College does.

The commandant of the War College is always a military man, currently Air Force Lt. Gen. John B. McPherson. He has two deputies, Rear Admiral Percival W. Jackson and J. Wesley Jones, a former ambassador to Peru and Libya. For the military, command jobs at the War College are almost always terminal posts, before retirement. The State Department deputy is usually a man on his way up. George F. Kennan was the first State Department deputy commandant, and he describes the beginnings of the college in his *Memoirs: 1925-1950*.

"The War College . . . focused on the interrelationship of military and non-military means in the promulgation of national policy. It was a course, in short, on strategic-military doctrine. . . . Not only were we all new to this subject, personally and institutionally, but we had, as we turned to it, virtually nothing in the way of an established or traditional American doctrine which we could take as a point of departure for our thinking and teaching. It was a mark of the weakness of all previous American thinking about international affairs that there was almost nothing in American political literature of the past one hundred years on the subject of the relationship of war to politics. American thinking about foreign policy had been primarily addressed to the problems of peace, and had taken place largely within the frameworks of

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
STATINTL

A military view

Intelligence change may peril security

By LT. GEN. IRA C. EAKER,
USAF (Ret.)

A recent Pentagon release advised that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) would report directly to the defense secretary and not to or through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) as in the past. Apparently, the JCS now will have no intelligence advisers reporting directly to them.



Lt. Gen. Eaker

This organizational change could represent a hazard to national security. Deprived of prompt and thorough intelligence, immediately available, the joint chiefs scarcely can discharge their function, assigned by the national defense act, of serving as the principal military advisers to the defense secretary and the President.

Prior to World War II, foreign intelligence came to the defense decision makers from two uncoordinated sources. Our ambassadors abroad reported to the secretary of state. Our military attaches rendered reports from their military contacts and observations to the secretaries of War and Navy.

OUR EXPERIENCE in World War II indicated the need for a third, more active, intelligence organization and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created. This agency rendered such valuable service that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) later was established to perform many of the functions of the wartime OSS.

The President and his Cabinet, the civilian side, then had this source of intelligence reporting directly to them.

The JCS and the military side had the DIA, formed after the war by combining the intelligence functions of the Army, Navy and Air Force.

These two intelligence channels, one on the civilian side and the other on the military side, have provided needed checks and balances. There are many cases where disaster was averted by this dual-

The most embarrassing intelligence

failures, such as Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis and the Pueblo incident, can be traced to the failure of the defense decision makers fully to use the evidence provided by one or another of these two intelligence channels.

UNDER THE NEW system it will be possible that an imperious defense secretary might say: "This is my decision; now give me an intelligence estimate to support it." This occurred prior to Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird's tenure.

There must be real concern when the JCS has to get intelligence secondhand. It also makes less certain that the commander in chief always will get sound intelligence estimates.

McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's principal national security adviser, it will be remembered, is reported to have said that there obviously were no Red missiles in Cuba, since it would be irrational for the Kremlin to put them there. But from the military intelligence side came the unmistakable evidence to the contrary, the U-2 photographs.

The civilian intelligence agencies and those under military jurisdiction historically have operated somewhat differently. The civilian side estimates what will happen, with reasons, while the military always has emphasized enemy capabilities, what he could do, with less emphasis on what he might do.

A CRITICAL and current example will illustrate this difference.

The civilian intelligence estimate might advise the President: "There is no evidence that the Reds now are servicing their nuclear submarines in Cuba." The military estimate, based on the same evidence, might say instead: "The Red base in Cuba is completed and ready to service Russian subs at any time."

The defense decision makers could be reassured by the former estimate but alerted by the latter.

The dual intelligence channels are like the human being with two ears and two eyes. This is no time for the United States to commit national mayhem, thus sight in one eye.

Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must be and where the money should be spent, instead of leaving it largely to the intelligence community. He has instructed his staff to survey the situation and report back within a year, it is hoped—with recommendations for budget cuts of as much as several hundred million dollars.

Not many years ago the Central Intelligence Agency and the other intelligence bureaus were portrayed as an "invisible empire" controlling foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boondoggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5-billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The Department spends more than 80

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1956 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission, and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel—much of it talented—in formulating policy.

Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit, tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontay prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted the Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos,

Cuba, last September. suspicions, based on the arm of a mother ship, plus two conspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intelligence behind-the-scenes negotiations and the President's rewarning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed ships "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist dealing with reporters, but in views over several months with Federal officials deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics numbers, deployment characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines, and airpower for the talks with Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off ground at the talks with this extremely sophisticated formation base," an official commented. "We don't give

our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '284 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's task is to put and organization of the

Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 57 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1966, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.


A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, the board's budget is about 10 per cent—\$500-million to

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Frank Mankiewicz and Tom Braden

Army's Non-Soldier Soldiers



WHEN ALLEN DULLES and other veterans of the wartime OSS persuaded President Truman to establish the Central Intelligence Agency, the American people were convinced that they were making a great saving in money and manpower as well as a businesslike stride toward efficiency. How badly they were deceived has now been revealed once again.

But the hue and cry which followed Sen. Sam Ervin's revelation that Army intelligence was spying on candidates for office and elected officials is the wrong hue and cry. Of course it is so palpably asinine that it is hard to imagine it as heralding a police state. The real danger which Sen. Ervin's revelation points to is something the courtly and venerable North Carolinian did not even mention.

The real danger is that the U.S. Army is so encumbered by unnecessary jobs that it has become the world's most monstrous example of a large investment for a small return.

Never in the history of nations has there been an army which provided so few fighting soldiers for such vast numbers of uniformed men. Never before has there been an army which recruited its soldiers with virtual promises that they will be given noncombat jobs.

ARMY INTELLIGENCE is only one example of how the Pentagon bureaucracy has thwarted the nation's defense. An intelligence job is a nonfighting job. If you have recruited soldiers on the basis of a promise that they will not have to fight, intelligence is one place to put them. Inevitably, the time will come when intelligence is so vastly overmanned that somebody will suggest spying on political candidates in order to give noncombatant soldiers something to do.

But intelligence is an instructive example because the promise of a central intelligence authority to watch over the nation's defense is of such recent memory. President Truman thought he had done the

job, and so did Allen Dulles. The three services were to conduct battle intelligence. The DIA was to conduct strategic intelligence and to act as the clearinghouse for information gathered by the military.

But within 10 years former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had created the Defense Intelligence Agency and was trying to beat the CIA with reports to President Kennedy. The new agency grew until it was larger than CIA and produced even more paper. But it did not halt the growth of its subsidiaries. Service intelligence agencies grew, too.

FOR ALL THIS investment—about \$3 billion per year—the nation has received, over the period of the war in Vietnam, an intelligence performance so dismal as to make historical comparison impossible. Information about enemy capability, enemy whereabouts and enemy troop strength has been consistently wrong.

Because it has been consistently wrong, three successive Presidents have

been made to look foolish, and the American people have been misled by so many victory-around-the-corner statements as to make farce approach tragedy.

The farce is defined in Melvin Laird's marvelously funny order to the Joint Chiefs of Staff last week. Defense Intelligence, said the Secretary of Defense, should cease spying upon American civilians, and the unit which had been doing so should be abolished. Then, with the wisdom granted only to those who have seen the defense bureaucracy at firsthand, Laird forbade the Joint Chiefs to set up another such unit in its place.

Tragedy is still waiting to be defined. But surely the possibility of tragedy exists in a defense establishment which requires that for every uniformed man who serves in a division nearly five uniformed men must back him up and that—as the revelations about the Defense Intelligence unit proved—many of these men have literally nothing to do.

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